

Contents

Page

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction..... | 2 |
| 1 Definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms..... | 3 |
| 1.1 Terms and definitions | 3 |
| 1.2 Symbols..... | 4 |
| 1.3 Abbreviated terms | 4 |
| 2 Cipher introduction | 5 |
| 2.1 Asymmetric cryptography with the Algebraic Eraser..... | 5 |
| 2.2 Encoding Algebraic Eraser Keys and Shared Secrets | 6 |
| 2.2.1 Encoding Matrices..... | 6 |
| 2.2.2 Encoding Permutations | 7 |
| 2.2.3 Encoding Braids | 7 |
| 2.3 Required Algebraic Eraser Parameters..... | 7 |
| 3 Parameter Definitions | 8 |
| 4 State diagram | 8 |
| 5 Initialization and resetting | 9 |
| 6 Authentication..... | 9 |
| 6.1 Tag Authentication | 9 |
| 7 Key table and key update | 14 |
| A.1 Algebraic Eraser (AEDH) Test Vectors for B10F256 | 15 |
| A.1.1 Tag Private Key..... | 15 |
| A.1.2 Tag Conjugacy Set | 15 |
| A.1.3 Tag Public Key | 15 |
| A.1.4 Interrogator Private Key..... | 16 |
| A.1.5 Interrogator Conjugacy Set | 17 |
| A.1.6 Interrogator Public Key (computed from Private Data) | 17 |
| A.1.7 Computed Shared Secret..... | 17 |
| B.1 Asymmetric cryptography with the Algebraic Eraser..... | 19 |
| B.1.1 AEKAP Public (Keyset) Parameters | 19 |
| B.1.2 AEKAP Public/Private Keypairs (Tag and Interrogator Keys) | 20 |
| B.1.3 Computing the Shared Secret | 20 |
| B.2 E-Multiplication | 21 |
| B.3 AE Implementation Considerations..... | 22 |
| C.1 B10F256 Keyset Parameters | 23 |

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

Introduction

The Algebraic Eraser™ (AE) cryptographic suite is an implementation of public-key cryptography which leverages the structure of the Braid group to execute a secure Diffie-Hellman type key exchange. The security of the suite is derived from the difficulty of solving sets of simultaneous conjugacy equations in the Braid group. The core one-way operation of the suite can be executed quickly on resource-constrained systems, making the AE suite appropriate to secure RFID Tag authentication for both active and passive RFID Tags.

This document specifies the security services of the AE cryptographic suite that can be used for an authenticated key exchange protocol.

SecureRF and Algebraic Eraser are trademarks, registered trademarks or service marks of SecureRF Corporation and used herein with permission.

Algebraic Eraser Over-the-Air Authentication

1 Definitions, symbols and abbreviated terms

1.1 Terms and definitions

For the purposes of this document, the terms and definitions given in ISO/IEC 19762 (all parts) and the following apply.

1.1.1 asymmetric cryptographic technique

cryptographic technique that uses two related operations: a public operation defined by a public data item, and a private operation defined by a private data item

NOTE: The two operations have the property that, given the public operation, it is computationally infeasible to derive the private operation.

[ISO/IEC 9798-5:2009, definition 2.3]

1.1.2 private key

private data item of an asymmetric pair, that shall be kept secret and should only be used by a claimant in accordance with an appropriate response formula, thereby establishing its identity

[ISO/IEC 9798-5:2009, definition 2.21]

1.1.3 public key

public data item of an asymmetric pair, that can be made public and shall be used by every verifier for establishing the claimant's identity

[ISO/IEC 9798-5:2009, definition 2.23]

1.1.4 random number

time variant parameter whose value is unpredictable

[ISO/IEC 9798-1:2010, definition 3.29]

1.1.5 response

procedure parameter produced by the claimant, and processed by the verifier for checking the identity of the claimant

[ISO/IEC 9798-5:2009, definition 2.25]

1.1.6 secret parameter

number or bit string that does not appear in the public domain and is only used by a claimant

NOTE: For instance, a private key.

[ISO/IEC 9798-5:2009, definition 2.26]

1.1.7 verifier

entity including the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges on behalf of an entity requiring an entity authentication or for engaging in verifying a signature of a given message and signer

NOTE: Adapted from ISO/IEC 9798-5:2009.

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

1.2 Symbols

For the purposes of this document, the following symbols and abbreviated terms apply.

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| PUB _i | Interrogator public key |
| PRV _i | Interrogator private key |
| PUB _t | Tag public key |
| PRV _t | Tag private key |
| CERT _t | Tag certificate containing PUB _t |
| K | shared secret between Interrogator and Tag resulting from AE key exchange protocol |
| L | length of shared secret used to authenticate Tag to Interrogator |
| B _N | Braid group of size N with $\{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{N-1}\}$, the Artin generators |
| CB($b_i^{\pm 1}$) | N-variable colored Burau matrix associated with $b_i^{\pm 1}$ |
| F _q | finite field of q elements (where $q = p^k$, for p (prime) and $k \geq 1$, e. g. 2^r) |
| S _N | permutation group on N symbols; $\sigma \in S_N$, can act on CB($b_i^{\pm 1}$), the result is denoted $\sigma \left(\text{CB}(b_i^{\pm 1}) \right)$ |
| T | values, $\{\tau_1, \tau_2, \dots, \tau_N\} \subseteq F_q$, a collection of invertible elements, the notation $\downarrow_{T\text{-values}}$ indicates replacing variables with the T – values. |
| * | E-multiplication as defined in Annex C. |
| M _* | The seed matrix public parameter used to generate private keys |

1.3 Abbreviated terms

| | |
|-------|--|
| AE | Algebraic Eraser |
| AEDH | Algebraic Eraser Diffie-Hellman |
| AEKAP | Algebraic Eraser Key Agreement Protocol (aka AEDH) |
| AEDHP | AEDH parameter |
| CCR | Commitment challenge response |
| CRC | Cyclic redundancy check |
| CS | Cryptographic suite |
| CSI | Cryptographic suite identifier |
| EBV | Extensible Bit Vector |
| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
| RFU | Reserved for Future Use |
| RN | Random Number |
| TAM | Tag authentication message |

2 Cipher introduction

The Algebraic Eraser is a group-based cryptographic tool [1] invented by Anshel, Anshel, Goldfeld, and Lemieux [2]. Like other group-based cryptographic protocols [3,4], the Algebraic Eraser uses non-abelian group operations to construct secure keys. In particular, the Algebraic Eraser uses the braid-group, B_N and has a Diffie-Hellman type structure. An introduction to the underlying algorithm and the defining parameters of the protocol follow and additional description is provided in Annex D.

The protocol describes a method to authenticate Tags based on *public keys* whose security is related to the hard problem of solving simultaneous conjugacy equations in the Braid Group B_N . This specification focuses on Tag Authentication and defines two profiles (which differ only in how the Interrogator obtains the Tag's public key).

Profile [i] (Tag authentication only):

The Interrogator begins the key exchange already in possession of the Tag's public key (PUB_t). The Interrogator produces a one-time use random private/public key pair (PRV_i/PUB_i). The Interrogator then sends PUB_i to the Tag and requests an authentication of length L. The Tag computes the shared secret K using PRV_t and PUB_i. The Tag then sends the requested portion of K of length L to the Interrogator. The Interrogator uses PRV_i and PUB_t to arrive at K and checks against the response from the Tag. If its result matches the block of length L, the Tag is authenticated.

Profile [ii] (Certificate on Tag):

The Interrogator begins by obtaining the Tag's certificate (CERT_t). The Tag sends its certificate, which contains its public key (PUB_t), to the Interrogator. The Interrogator obtains PUB_t from CERT_t. The protocol then follows Profile [i]. This protocol allows for tracking the Tag via the Tag's fixed CERT_t.

Once the shared secret is generated it can be used to encrypt another set of data, which would allow for a secure communication channel in addition to Tag authentication, however these features are out of scope for this standard.

Issues such as the key infrastructure required to support the techniques described in this Cryptographic Suite are outside the scope of the document. They remain, nevertheless, important considerations when assessing the suitability of any Cryptographic Suite for a given application. As this Cryptographic Suite is a Public Key system it does not require maintaining a secure database of secret keys.

2.1 Asymmetric cryptography with the Algebraic Eraser

The AE Key Exchange Protocol (AEKAP) enables two users, Alice and Bob, to evaluate a shared secret using their own private key and the public key of the other user. For the purposes of this specification, a Tag plays the role of Alice and an Interrogator plays the role of Bob. The following definitions are used in the description algorithm which provides the security for this protocol.

The AEKAP contains the following public information that define a particular keyset (this can be considered the AE equivalent to a Diffie-Hellman group parameter prime, or ECC curve parameters):

- A fixed matrix with elements in the finite field, $M_* \in GL(N, F_q)$,
- A set of conjugates in B_N for each group, Tags $\{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_k\}$ and Interrogators $\{d_1, d_2, \dots, d_\ell\}$.
- A set of T-values (an array of N entries where each entry is in the field F_q)

This public information (matrix, user conjugate set, and T-values) make up the keyspace for AEKAP. For two users to communicate they must share a common keyspace. This is similar to Diffie-Hellman where you

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

choose a common prime, or in ECC where you choose a common curve. In AEKAP you choose a common matrix and conjugate set. The main difference is that there are two sets of conjugates in the set and each user must choose theirs from the opposite set (e.g., Tags choose from set A, and Interrogators from set B).

The public parameters are generally chosen ahead of time and published for users to use (see Annex C). For a 2^{80} security level parameters come from B10F256 (a braid with 10 strands and a field over 256 (2^8)).

The user private/public key pairs of the AEKAP are derived from the public parameters. User Private data have two components

- The Private key is an $N \times N$ Matrix where each of the N^2 entries is a member of the field F_q -- computed based on the public keyspace matrix M_* .
- The conjugacy set consists of a random product of a sequence of the user's conjugates, again in the case of Alice, $c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdot \dots \cdot c_{i_{L_A}}$ which is itself an element in the Braid group.

In other words the user randomly chooses L_A conjugates (and their inverses) from the user's conjugate set in the keyspace and combines them together. This combination can happen in real time, or, because the result is just another entry in the Braid group (e.g. another conjugate) it can be pre-computed and reduced for storage.

To compute the inverse of a braid you reverse the order of all the Artin generators and then you take the inverse of each. For example, if you had the braid $b_1 b_2 b_3^{-1} b_2^{-1}$, to compute the inverse you reverse and invert the generators resulting in $b_2 b_3 b_2^{-1} b_1^{-1}$.

Alice's public key is obtained via E-Multiplication of the Private Key with the Conjugacy Set. The result of the E-Multiplication is a pair: an $N \times N$ matrix where each entry is a member of the field F_q , and a permutation of N entries (S_N). This is the composition of the Public Key.

Obtaining the shared secret/exchanged key:

- Alice receives Bob's public key (M_B, σ_B), an $N \times N$ Matrix and a Permutation, and computes the shared secret by a combination of matrix multiplication first with their own Private Key and then using E-Multiplication to iterate down their conjugacy set. The result is the shared secret, an $N \times N$ Matrix and a Permutation.
- Likewise, Bob receives Alice's public key and computes the equivalent computation, performing a matrix multiplication and then an iterative E-multiplication down their conjugacy set. As before, the result of this computation is an $N \times N$ Matrix and a Permutation.

2.2 Encoding Algebraic Eraser Keys and Shared Secrets

The Algebraic Eraser uses Matrices, Permutations, and Braids. The following define how these data structures are encoded and transferred between Tags and Interrogators.

2.2.1 Encoding Matrices

An $N \times N$ Matrix has N^2 entries. Each entry is a member of the finite field F_q (a number from 0 to $q-1$). The most compact method to encode this matrix is to "bit pack" the entries. For example, if N is 16 and q is 32 (aka B16F32) each of the 256 matrix entries uses five (5) bits. Therefore the encoding would occur by taking the five (5) bits of the first matrix entry and combine them with the first three (3) bits of the second entry into the first

matrix octet. For the second octet take the remaining two (2) bits of the second entry, all five (5) bits of the third entry, and the first (1) bit of the fourth entry. This process continues until you reach the end. Any extra bits in the final octet must be zero.

Note, however, that, not all entries in the matrix are used. In particular, due to the way Algebraic Eraser Public Keys are generated the last row in the matrix is always all zeros, except for the last entry. Therefore, when packing the matrix you should elide the “row of zeros”. I.e. you pack rows 1 to N-1 as above, but then for the Nth row you skip the first N-1 entries and jump directly to the Nth and final entry in the matrix.

2.2.2 Encoding Permutations

A Permutation is a set of N entries from 0 to N-1. Packing a Permutation uses the same “bit packing” process as with matrices.

Like the matrix encoding, the last octet of the encoded permutation should pad with zero bits as necessary.

2.2.3 Encoding Braids

As braids are not transferred between communicants the encoding of braids is currently left as a local matter. However, it is recommended that implementors consider encoding braids in their own “bit packed” format in order to reduce the amount of required storage space. Each braid element contains an Artin generator (a number from 1 to N-1) and an exponent (+1 or -1). This can be encoded by taking one bit for the exponent (a value of zero (0) signifies an exponent of 1, value of one (1) signifies an exponent of -1) and then as many bits as necessary to encode the generator. Note that there is no Artin generator b_0 , so we encode $b_1..b_{N-1}$ using the numbers 0 to N-2.

For example, using B10 (N=10), the braid generator requires four (4) bits; adding the exponent makes that five(5) (NB: this is true for all braids where N=9 through N=16). So if you had a braid of $b_1 b_2 b_1^{-1}$ this would be encoded as the binary: $00000_2 00001_2 10000_2$, which packs into hex $00_n 60_n$. (Notice the last octet is padded with a single zero bit).

2.3 Required Algebraic Eraser Parameters

This specification requires implementation of AEDH parameters for interoperability. To conform to this specification a Tag shall choose and implement one AEDH parameter keyset, and an Interrogator shall implement all required keysets. For security level 2^{80} , Tags and Interrogators shall implement B10F256. The exact keysets (Matrix, Conjugates, and T-values) required by this specification are documented in Annex C.

NOTE: Security levels listed here are derived from the calculations of security from [2] and are based on the work factor to break the keys or messages. As with all asymmetric algorithms the security level is not the same as the key size.

In general a Tag only needs to implement a single AEDH parameter to be compliant and expects the Interrogator to determine that either by the certificate (in which the keyset parameter used by the Tag is explicit) or by other out-of-band means (however the Interrogator acquires the Tag public key PUB_t). Interrogators are expected to implement multiple parameters in order to authenticate multiple Tags and discover the keyset parameter via implicit (profile [i]) or explicit (profile [ii]) notification.

The parameter in use defines the exact sizes of the matrix and permutation to be sent by the Interrogator to the Tag which means an explicit length parameter is not required. If the data is the wrong length the Tag shall reply with an error.

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

3 Parameter Definitions

| Parameter | Description |
|------------------------------|--|
| FN[7:0] | The number of fragmentations and last-fragment marker: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• [7] : last fragment bit (set when this is the last fragment)• [6 :0] : current fragment number |
| AuthType[1:0] | This shows the authentication type in the authentication procedure. The values are as following: <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 00₂: reserved for mutual authentication▪ 01₂: reserved for the use of Interrogator authentication▪ 10₂: Tag authentication▪ 11₂: RFU |
| AuthStep[2:0] | This shows the step number in the authentication procedure. The values are as following: <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 000₂: Step 1 of Authenticate procedure▪ 001₂: Step 2 of Authenticate procedure▪ 010₂-111₂: RFU |
| AEDHP[Variable] | AEDH parameter. This field consists of the packed public key matrix followed by the packed public key permutation. The length of this field is dependent on the agreed-upon Keyset Parameter |
| Cert _x [Variable] | The digital certificate of x. x can be Tag, Interrogator or TTP. |
| Profile[2;0] | This shows the explicit profile to use. The values are the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none">▪ 000₂: Profile [i]▪ 001₂: Profile [ii]▪ 010₂-111₂: RFU |


Table 1 -- Definition of parameters

4 State diagram

This document defines two states: an INITIAL state and a WAITING state.

The Tag used for the AE cryptographic suite will be powered up in its INITIAL state, and return to this state after a successful or unsuccessful authentication. Timeout controls could be added to the key exchange at the discretion of the implementer for added security. However, the Tag will resume function iISO/n the INITIAL state after such time. The WAITING state is used if the Interrogator fragments the authentication request message and shall be used to wait for a complete authentication request. Once the request is complete (all fragments have been received) then the Tag will perform the computation and return to the INITIAL state.

The transition between states is specified in Figure 1 - Tag State Diagram.



1. TAM-1.0 CERTIFICATE REQUEST/RESPONSE (WITH OR WITHOUT FRAGMENTATION BY TAG)
2. TAM-1.1 REQUEST
3. TAM-1.1 RESPONSE (REQUESTING NEXT FRAGMENT)
4. WHEN THE REQUEST IS COMPLETE (ALL FRAGMENTS RECEIVED), TRANSITION TO THE AE COMPUTATION
5. TAM-1.1 RESPONSE WITH AUTHENTICATION RESULT
6. ERROR MESSAGE OR TIMEOUT

Figure 1 – State machine of Algebraic Eraser Crypto Suite

5 Initialization and resetting

This Cryptographic Suite does not require initialization. The behavior on reset is to return to the initial state.

Implementations of this suite shall assure that all memory used for intermediate results is cleared after each operation (message-response pair) and after reset.

The cryptographic suite shall be reset on power-on.

6 Authentication

The authentication protocol of this crypto suite uses a challenge-response protocol described below. In particular it describes the use of the Algebraic Eraser AEDH key agreement scheme to establish a secure channel and simultaneously authenticate the Tag to the Interrogator (Tag Authentication).

6.1 Tag Authentication

The Tag authentication messaging sequence (TAM) of this crypto suite outlined in Figure 2. This TAM is used for all Profiles of this mechanism, with Profile-specific details included in each of the following subsections.

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication




Figure 2 - Message exchange for tag authentication for all Profiles of the AE crypto suite

6.1.1 Certificate Request (TAM 1.0 Message) (OPTIONAL: Profile [ii])

The Interrogator may have the Tag's public key (PUB_t) via out of band mechanisms (profile [i]). Alternately, if the Interrogator does not have it, then it must request it from the Tag (profile [ii]). The message consists of the AuthStep (000₂) and next fragment number.

| | AuthStep | Padding | Offset | Length |
|-------------|------------------|---------|----------------------|------------------------------|
| # of bits | 3 | 5 | 16 | 16 |
| description | 000 ₂ | RFU | Offset into response | Length of requested response |

Table 4 - CERT_REQ (TAM 1.0 Message)

The fields of the TAM 1.0 message shall have the following meaning:

- AuthStep: This field shall be three (3) bits in length and specifies the step number in the procedure. Each authentication procedure requires a pre-determined number of steps. In the TAM 1.0 Message, the value is 000₂.
- Padding: 5 bits that shall remain 0
- Offset: This field shall be sixteen (16) bits in length and specifies the offset (in bytes) into the CERT Response message to send back to the Interrogator.
- Length: This field shall be sixteen (16) bits in length and specifies the length (in bytes) that are requested by the Interrogator (starting from the offset). A length of 0 implies the Tag shall send the complete response message.

NOTE: The Interrogator completely controls fragmentation because it is best able to ascertain bitrate and transmission losses. As the TAM 1.0 Response (Certificate response) is a static message, the Tag need only send back the desired portion.

6.1.2 Certificate Response (TAM 1.0 Response) (Profile [ii])

The TAM 1.0 RESPONSE consists of a Length, the response profile, Padding, the Maximum Fragment Size, and the Tag Certificate.

| | Length | Profile | Padding | Max Frag Size | CERT_t |
|-------------|----------------|-----------------|---------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| # of bits | 16 | 3 | 5 | 16 | Variable |
| description | Message length | Profile Version | RFU | Maximum Fragmentation Size | Tag Certificate (or fragment thereof) |

Table 5 - CERT_REP (TAM 1.0 RESPONSE)

The fields of the TAM 1.0 response shall have the following meaning:

- a) Length: This field shall be 16 bits in length and specifies the length (in bytes) of this response. This field shall be the requested length or the actual available data length, whichever is less. The length is only the length of the returned data, which includes the Profile, Padding, Max Frag Size, and Certificate data (or portions thereof). When the data is fragmented the Profile, Padding, and Max Frag Size shall only be sent in the first fragment in which they occur. I.e. consider the Profile, Padding, Max Frag Size, and Certificate data as a single, constant, static buffer, and the fragmentation and length break apart that single buffer.
- b) Profile: This field shall be three (3) bits in length and specifies the AE Profile in use. For this specification this should be Profile [ii] (binary 001₂). It is sent only in the first fragment.
- c) Padding: This field shall be five (5) bits in length which shall always be zero. It is reserved for future use. It is sent only in the first fragment.
- d) Max Frag Size: This field shall be sixteen (16) bits in length and specifies the maximum fragmentation size supported by the Tag. The Interrogator shall never send a fragment larger than this size. If this size is zero (0) then the Tag is indicating support for any fragmentation size (including support for complete, unfragmented messages).
- e) CERT_t: This field specifies the digital certificate of the Tag (or fragment thereof)

6.1.3 When the Interrogator receives the CERT_REP message it reconstructs the CERT_t data for processing. The Interrogator can immediately determine the keyset parameters and PUB_t by parsing the certificate. It can also verify the authenticity by validating the certificate. **Authenticate (TAM 1.1 Message)**

The Interrogator's authentication request (TAM 1.1 MESSAGE) is composed of an AuthStep (001₂), AuthType (10₂), the Interrogator's single-use public key (PUB_i), the size and location of the block K[I] requested for authentication. The recipient Tag will use PUB_i as part of the Algebraic Eraser Key Exchange.

| | AuthStep | Pad 1 | FN | Length | AuthType | Pad 2 | PUB_i | Loc | Size |
|-------------|------------------|-------|----------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|-------|-------------------------|---------------|-----------|
| # of bits | 3 | 5 | 8 | 16 | 2 | 6 | Variable | 8 | 8 |
| description | 001 ₂ | RFU | Fragmentation number | Message (or fragment) length | 10 ₂ | RFU | Interrogator Public Key | Auth Location | Auth Size |

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

Table 8 - AUTHENTICATE (TAM 1.1 MESSAGE)

The fields of the TAM 1.1 message shall have the following meaning:

- a) AuthStep: This field shall be three (3) bits in length and specifies the step number in the procedure. Each authentication procedure requires a pre-determined number of steps. In the TAM 1.1 Message, the value is 001_2 .
- b) Pad 1: This field shall be five (5) bits in length and shall always be zero. It is reserved for future use.
- c) FN: This field shall be eight (8) bits in length and specifies the current fragmentation number. To prevent retransmission of the complete message in the case of a transmission error the message can be broken into multiple fragments. The initial message starts at fragment zero (0), and increments with every additional fragment. When the final fragment is sent the high bit (80_h) gets set. In the event of an error in transmission the Tag will respond with a message that will cause the Interrogator to resend the same fragment (which implies not incrementing the fragment number).
- d) Length: This field shall be 16 bits in length and specifies the length (in bytes) of this message or fragment. The length is only the length of the following data, which is the Auth Type, Pad 2, Public Key, Location, and Size. When the data is fragmented the Auth Type and Pad2 shall only be sent in the first fragment, the Loc data shall only be sent in the last (or second-to-last) fragment, and the Size shall only be sent in the last fragment. If this value is larger than the Tag supported Max Frag Size then the Tag shall return a FRAG_TOO_BIG error.
- e) AuthType: This field shall be two (2) bits in length and the values of the AuthType field are as follows:
 - 00_2 : reserved for the future use of mutual authentication
 - 01_2 : reserved for the future use of Interrogator authentication
 - 10_2 : Tag authentication
 - 11_2 : Other

This field is only sent in the first fragment (fragment 0)

- f) Pad 2: This field shall be six (6) bits in length and shall always be zero. It is reserved for future use. This field is only sent in the first fragment (fragment 0)
- g) PUB_i: This field specifies the Interrogator Public Key to use in the AE Key Agreement. This is the packed matrix and packed permutation. The Tag knows exactly how big this data is because the size is completely defined by the B_nF_q in use.
- h) Loc: This field shall be eight (8) bits and specify the offset in bytes into the computed shared secret for the Tag to reply. When the Tag computes the shared secret it packs the data into an octet-string and then replies starting at this offset. This field will only get sent in the last (or second-to-last) fragment. Note that this value shall not be greater than the size of PUB_i and the tag shall consider it a fatal error if Loc is too large, returning an AUTH_FAILURE error.
- i) Size: This field shall be eight (8) bits and specify the length in bits of the authentication reply. This field will only get sent in the last fragment. Note that this value shall not be greater than the size of PUB_i and the tag shall consider it a fatal error if Size is too large.

The Tag, upon receiving a complete Authenticate Request, will read the PUB_i and compute the shared secret and respond with the requested authentication response. In the event of a fragmented message, the Tag will respond with a TAM 1.1 Response signaling whether the fragment was received correctly or not and wait until the complete request is received. Note that an implementation may begin processing PUB_i prior to a complete Authenticate Request being received, thereby limiting the size of the FIFO input buffer required. This implementation choice will drive the size of the maximum supported fragment size.

6.1.4 Authenticate Response (TAM 1.1 Response)

The Authenticate Response (TAM 1.1 RESPONSE) allows a Tag to authenticate to the Interrogator or signal that the fragmented request message was (or was not) successfully received. Once the Tag receives a complete

request message it computes the shared secret and sends a block of the shared secret specified in the TAM 1.1 Message (K[1]).

| | | |
|-------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
| | FN | K[1] |
| # of bits | 8 | Variable |
| description | Next requested fragment | Authentication code |

TABLE 9 - AUTHENTICATE RESPONSE (TAM 1.1 RESPONSE)

The fields of the TAM 1.1 response shall have the following meaning:

- a) FN: Next Requested Fragment. If the request message is received correctly (the air interface received it correctly and the fragmentation number is the next in the sequence) then this field will contain the next fragment (i.e., if the request was fragment zero (0), this field will contain one (1)). If the request message is not received correctly (an error is detected or the fragmentation number is out of sequence) then this field will contain the correct fragment number (e.g., if the request was fragment three (3) and the air interface indicated an error in the message, this field will contain three (3)). This rule is true even when the request specifies this is the last fragment (high bit 80_h is set). Note that this does imply the tag needs to keep count of the expected next fragment number and shall verify that the correct fragment was sent.
- b) K[I]: This field contains the Size bits of the computed shared secret starting at location Loc. It is only sent in response to the final fragment (the fragment number high bit, 80_h, is set). If Loc and Size are set such that the end of the shared secret is reached then the response K shall wrap around to the beginning. If Size is not a multiple of 8 bits than this field shall be padded at the end with 0 bits until the next full byte.

6.1.5 Message Fragmentation

Some times messages in this specification can get very large. In order to reduce the amount of retransmission that may be required messages can be fragmented into smaller pieces. In the event of a transmission error this allows retransmission of only the fragment instead of requiring retransmission of the entire message.

Fragmentation is always controlled by the Interrogator because it always has a better capability to detect the environment, however the Tag may signal the maximum supported fragmentation size in the TAM 1.0 response based on its implementation. (Note that an Interrogator that acquired the Tag PUB_t data out-of-band shall also acquire the Tag max fragment size by the same out-of-band method). The Tag must be capable of handling fragmented messages of any size up to and including the maximum supported size reported. This does imply that a Tag must be able to accept a single fragment of e.g. 100 bytes or 100 fragments of 1 byte and all points in between, however the Tag controls how large this can get (based on how much data it can buffer during processing).

When messages are fragmented all fields prior to the fragmentation number and message length are repeated in every message. Every field after the fragmentation number and message length are only sent once. This effectively builds a single message payload of all the fields, breaks it up into pieces, and then sends each piece as a fragment, starting with fragment zero. If a fragment is received successfully then the receiver responds and requests the next fragment; if a fragment is not received successfully it responds re-requesting the same fragment.

When both actors (Interrogator and Tag) behave correctly the fragments will start at 0 and count until the last fragment; which is signalled by setting the high bit. For example if there are three fragments they will be sent as hex values 00_h, 01_h, 82_h. The responder will notify the sender whether the fragment was received correctly or

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

needs resending by incrementing the fragment number when it was properly received and not incrementing when it was not properly received.

A bad actor could send fragments out of order. This shall be considered a fatal error and result in a reset to the initial state.

7 Key table and key update

The Tag shall store in memory the following values:

- The private data value PRV_t which is used by the Tag for the computation of the response. Note that this is in two parts, the Private Key which is a Matrix, and the conjugacy set which is a Braid.
- The public key value PUB_t which is used by the Tag for communication with the Interrogator.
- The keyset T-values
- Optionally the signed public key value, CERT_t, which the Interrogator can use to verify PUB_t.

This cryptographic suite does not support other cryptographic functions such as updating the key.

Annex A (informative)

Test Vectors

A.1 Algebraic Eraser (AEDH) Test Vectors for B10F256

The following sections show examples using the B10F256 keyset in Annex C.1.

A.1.1 Tag Private Key

The Tag Private Key is a Matrix that looks like:

```

213 34 151 79 72 107 97 59 164 1
79 73 138 230 68 86 173 115 132 71
123 184 36 190 157 171 120 169 193 219
0 15 75 59 133 166 202 144 143 48
55 10 228 208 176 180 67 250 43 50
31 170 65 45 159 255 173 92 210 96
9 195 171 29 119 58 195 249 194 26
12 162 25 15 20 85 207 154 76 123
34 182 82 35 186 153 78 221 79 24
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61

```

And encodes into the following octet string for ease of storage:

```

d5 22 97 4f 48 6b 61 3b a4 01 4f 49 8a e6 44 56 ad 73 84 47 7b b8 24 be 9d ab
78 a9 c1 db 00 0f 4b 3b 85 a6 ca 90 8f 30 37 0a e4 d0 b0 b4 43 fa 2b 32 1f aa
41 2d 9f ff ad 5c d2 60 09 c3 ab 1d 77 3a c3 f9 c2 1a 0c a2 19 0f 14 55 cf 9a
4c 7b 22 b6 52 23 ba 99 4e dd 4f 18 3d

```

It was derived from the Keyset Seed Matrix M_* using the following choices for α_i :

$$\alpha_0 = 163, \alpha_1 = 68, \alpha_2 = 46, \alpha_3 = 204, \alpha_4 = 30, \alpha_5 = 34, \alpha_6 = 153, \alpha_7 = 213, \alpha_8 = 135, \alpha_9 = 207$$

A.1.2 Tag Conjugacy Set

The Tag Conjugacy Set is created by randomly choosing conjugates and their inverses. This example key was created using the following choices (numbered 0-31) from the Tag Conjugates in Annex C.1.4:

$$c_0 = 12(inv), c_1 = 8, c_2 = 27, c_3 = 12(inv), c_4 = 15(inv), c_5 = 25(inv), c_6 = 28, c_7 = 7(inv), c_8 = 16,$$

$$c_9 = 4, c_{10} = 31(inv), c_{11} = 5(inv), c_{12} = 2, c_{13} = 5, c_{14} = 5(inv), c_{15} = 2, c_{16} = 4(inv)$$

A.1.3 Tag Public Key

The Tag Public Key is a Matrix and Permutation which can be computed via E-Multiplication of the Private Key with the Conjugacy Set, starting with the identity permutation. The resulting Public Key Matrix looks like:

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
194 228 126 60 34 188 184 184 47 222
133 80 198 251 203 209 21 46 49 48
137 245 194 214 62 239 210 207 120 8
13 12 42 117 22 199 44 59 153 119
7 125 179 128 64 182 31 90 80 169
66 45 144 178 138 99 23 217 94 128
168 110 86 198 141 205 254 108 224 144
247 150 173 28 80 92 109 86 233 245
54 183 32 224 46 178 21 120 69 40
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 61
```

And the permutation is:

```
0 1 2 3 6 7 9 5 8 4
```

This encodes into the following octet string which gets sent over the air:

```
c2 e4 7e 3c 22 bc b8 b8 2f de 85 50 c6 fb cb d1 15 2e 31 30 89 f5 c2
d6 3e ef d2 cf 78 08 0d 0c 2a 75 16 c7 2c 3b 99 77 07 7d b3 80 40 b6
1f 5a 50 a9 42 2d 90 b2 8a 63 17 d9 5e 80 a8 6e 56 c6 8d cd fe 6c e0
90 f7 96 ad 1c 50 5c 6d 56 e9 f5 36 b7 20 e0 2e b2 15 78 45 28 3d

01 23 67 95 84
```

A.1.4 Interrogator Private Key

The Interrogator Private Key is a Matrix that looks like:

```
53 208 52 191 244 116 127 180 54 69
159 96 203 189 236 252 164 199 10 104
156 149 253 236 131 47 70 158 73 139
122 207 76 15 88 71 118 101 25 49
236 135 51 192 155 9 155 218 209 154
48 188 174 90 15 231 181 139 132 247
217 28 221 167 118 85 201 79 130 210
2 193 4 108 65 231 17 26 242 167
208 200 106 107 132 116 115 34 113 105
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
```

And encodes into the following octet string for ease of storage:

```
35 d0 34 bf f4 74 7f b4 36 45 9f 60 cb bd ec fc a4 c7 0a 68 9c 95 fd
ec 83 2f 46 9e 49 8b 7a cf 4c 0f 58 47 76 65 19 31 ec 87 33 c0 9b 09
9b da d1 9a 30 bc ae 5a 0f e7 b5 8b 84 f7 d9 1c dd a7 76 55 c9 4f 82
d2 02 c1 04 6c 41 e7 11 1a f2 a7 d0 c8 6a 6b 84 74 73 22 71 69 11
```

It was derived from the Keyset Seed Matrix M_* using the following choices for α_i :

$$\alpha_0 = 222, \alpha_1 = 199, \alpha_2 = 186, \alpha_3 = 164, \alpha_4 = 213, \alpha_5 = 210, \alpha_6 = 208, \alpha_7 = 223, \alpha_8 = 2, \alpha_9 = 28$$

A.1.5 Interrogator Conjugacy Set

The Interrogator Conjugacy Set is created by randomly choosing conjugates and their inverses. This example key was created using the following choices (numbered 0-31) from the Interrogator Conjugates in Annex C.1.5:

$$d_0 = 22, d_1 = 0, d_2 = 3(inv), d_3 = 11(inv), d_4 = 3, d_5 = 10, d_6 = 20, d_7 = 24, d_8 = 8(inv), d_9 = 25(inv), d_{10} = 0(inv), d_{11} = 21, d_{12} = 9(inv), d_{13} = 26, d_{14} = 13(inv), d_{15} = 21(inv), d_{16} = 9(inv)$$

A.1.6 Interrogator Public Key (computed from Private Data)

Using E-multiplication one can compute the Interrogator Public Key from the Private Data in the previous two sections. This computation results in a Matrix that looks like:

```

76 59 67 60 26 52 57 44 124 218
55 125 138 214 227 11 186 208 175 179
193 239 37 103 221 56 78 165 199 132
18 69 48 100 126 222 181 133 98 246
21 165 14 186 198 143 147 237 61 34
203 196 122 135 41 232 15 90 134 252
239 229 176 229 4 176 144 194 103 116
170 188 23 189 254 55 175 88 178 124
36 44 100 109 128 255 245 139 228 196
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
    
```

And a permutation:

```
2 3 1 0 4 5 6 7 8 9
```

This encodes into the following octet string which gets sent over the air:

```

4c 3b 43 3c 1a 34 39 2c 7c da 37 7d 8a d6 e3 0b ba d0 af b3 c1 ef 25
67 dd 38 4e a5 c7 84 12 45 30 64 7e de b5 85 62 f6 15 a5 0e ba c6 8f
93 ed 3d 22 cb c4 7a 87 29 e8 0f 5a 86 fc ef e5 b0 e5 04 b0 90 c2 67
74 aa bc 17 bd fe 37 af 58 b2 7c 24 2c 64 6d 80 ff f5 8b e4 c4 11

23 10 45 67 89
    
```

A.1.7 Computed Shared Secret

When you combine the Tag Public Key with the Interrogator Private Data you compute a shared secret that has a matrix that looks like:

```

56 161 201 181 21 56 179 27 122 168
10 132 136 145 193 61 177 74 3 163
0 50 139 226 116 61 203 88 156 144
1 85 206 43 27 4 106 11 127 231
246 20 19 171 118 135 167 110 238 7
6 153 116 150 143 88 3 95 242 232
139 127 130 110 244 124 107 210 62 150
119 154 77 154 167 255 216 73 85 235
60 190 220 26 150 81 242 95 183 19
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 192
    
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

And a permutation that looks like:

2 3 1 0 6 7 9 5 8 4

Which encodes into the following octet string:

38 a1 c9 b5 15 38 b3 1b 7a a8 0a 84 88 91 c1 3d b1 4a 03 a3 00 32 8b
e2 74 3d cb 58 9c 90 01 55 ce 2b 1b 04 6a 0b 7f e7 f6 14 13 ab 76 87
a7 6e ee 07 06 99 74 96 8f 58 03 5f f2 e8 8b 7f 82 6e f4 7c 6b d2 3e
96 77 9a 4d 9a a7 ff d8 49 55 eb 3c be dc 1a 96 51 f2 5f b7 13 c0

23 10 67 95 84

If Loc = 15 and Size = 27, then the tag would respond with 27 bits of the shared secret starting with byte-offset 15, padding the result:

3d b1 4a 00

Annex B (informative)

Cipher description

B.1 Asymmetric cryptography with the Algebraic Eraser

The AE Key Exchange Protocol (AEKAP) enables two users, Alice and Bob, to evaluate a shared secret using their own private key and the public key of the other user. The following definitions are used in the description algorithm which provides the security for this protocol where Alice is a Tag and Bob is an Interrogator.

B.1.1 AEKAP Public (Keyset) Parameters

The AEKAP contains the following public information:

- A fixed matrix $M_* \in GL(N, F_q)$, which is chosen to ensure security (see [7]),
- A set of conjugates in B_N for each group, Tags:

$$C = \{c_1 = za_1z^{-1}, c_2 = za_2z^{-1}, \dots, c_k = za_kz^{-1}\},$$

and Interrogators:

$$D = \{d_1 = zb_1z^{-1}, d_2 = zb_2z^{-1}, \dots, d_\ell = zb_\ell z^{-1}\},$$

where it is assumed that each of the conjugates is *rewritten*, i.e., a Braid group algorithm [5,6] is applied to the conjugates making the element z intractable to derive. The Braid element z , together with the Braid group elements $a_1, \dots, a_k, b_1, \dots, b_\ell$ are chosen to insure security. One important feature of these sets of braid elements is that $a_i b_j = b_j a_i$, for all $i = 1, \dots, k, j = 1, \dots, \ell$.

- A set of T-values, which is an array of N entries in F_q that get used as part of the E-multiplication.

This public information (matrix, user conjugate set, and T-values) make up the keyspace for AEKAP. For two users to communicate they must share a common keyspace. This is similar to Diffie-Hellman where you choose a common prime, or in ECC where you choose a common curve. In AEKAP you choose a common matrix and conjugate set. The main difference is that there are two sets of conjugates in the set and each user must choose theirs from the opposite set (e.g., Tags choose from set A, and Interrogators from set B).

Note that M_* must be of a special form to prevent certain classes of weak-key attacks, similar conceptually to the attacks possible if an RSA key is chosen randomly or chosen using two large random primes instead of computed as the product of two large primes chosen to prevent known attacks. The special method of choosing the matrix assures that this class of attack is not possible. Similarly, braid element z must be chosen to be large enough to prevent a different class of attacks, similar conceptually to choosing a Diffie-Hellman prime that's too small.

Note that the matrix M_* T-values, and the conjugate sets C and D are created once and shared amongst all Tags and Interrogators. All Interrogators know the Interrogator conjugates (D), all Tags know the Tag conjugates (C), and everyone knows the matrix and T-values. Also note that the Matrix and conjugates are only required to generate a keypair. Once a keypair is generated only the T-values remain necessary to compute the shared secret. So in the case of a Tag with a fixed (static) keypair, it only needs to know the T-values and its public/private keys and not the public matrix or Tag conjugates.

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

It is expected that Interrogators will have the full keyset parameter data available (matrix and Interrogator conjugates) in order to generate ephemeral keys. For Tags it's expected that static keys will get generated during manufacture, so the manufacturer must have access to the keyset parameter data (matrix and conjugates), but the Tags will not.

B.1.2 AEKAP Public/Private Keypairs (Tag and Interrogator Keys)

User Private Data have two components

- The Private key is a polynomial of degree $N-1$ in the matrix M_* with coefficients in the field F_q : in the case of Alice,

$$M_A = \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \alpha_i M_*^i.$$

In other words, the Private Key (M_A) is an $N \times N$ Matrix where each of the N^2 entries is a member of the field F_q -- computed based on the public keyspace matrix M_* .

- The Conjugacy Set consists of a product of a sequence of the user's conjugates, again in the case of Alice,

$$c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdot \dots \cdot c_{i_{L_A}}$$

which is itself an element in the Braid group.

In other words the user randomly chooses L_A conjugates (and their inverses) from the user's conjugate set in the keyspace and combines them together. This combination can happen in real time, or, because the result is just another entry in the Braid group (e.g. another conjugate) it can be reduced for storage, generally ending up about twice the size of the published conjugates.

To compute the inverse of a braid you reverse the order of all the Artin generators and then you take the inverse of each. For example, if you had the braid $b_1 b_2 b_3^{-1} b_2^{-1}$, to compute the inverse you reverse and inverse the generators resulting in $b_2 b_3 b_2^{-1} b_1^{-1}$.

- Alice's public key is obtained via E-Multiplication:

$$(M_A, 1) \star (c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdot \dots \cdot c_{i_{L_A}}, \sigma_{c_{i_1}} \cdot \sigma_{c_{i_2}} \cdot \dots \cdot \sigma_{c_{i_{L_A}}}),$$

where 1 is the identity permutation in S_N .

In other words, the result of the E-Multiplication is a pair: an $N \times N$ matrix where each entry is a member of the field F_q , and a permutation of N entries (S_N). This is the composition of the Public Key.

B.1.3 Computing the Shared Secret

Both Alice and Bob can simultaneously compute the shared secret/exchanged key by using their own private data and the public key of the other:

- Alice receives Bob's public key,

$$(M_B, 1) \star (d_{j_1} \cdot d_{j_2} \cdot \dots \cdot d_{j_{L_B}}, \sigma_{d_{j_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{j_2}} \cdot \dots \cdot \sigma_{d_{j_{L_B}}})$$

and computes

$$(M_A, 1) \cdot (M_B, 1) \star \left(d_{j_1} \cdot d_{j_2} \cdots d_{j_{L_B}}, \sigma_{d_{j_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{j_2}} \cdots \sigma_{d_{j_{L_B}}} \right) \star \left(c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdots c_{i_{L_A}}, \sigma_{c_{i_1}} \cdot \sigma_{c_{i_2}} \cdots \sigma_{c_{i_{L_A}}} \right).$$

Likewise, Bob receives Alice's public key and computes

$$(M_B, 1) \cdot (M_A, 1) \star \left(c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdots c_{i_{L_A}}, \sigma_{d_{i_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{i_2}} \cdots \sigma_{d_{i_{L_B}}} \right) \star \left(d_{j_1} \cdot d_{j_2} \cdots d_{j_{L_B}}, \sigma_{d_{j_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{j_2}} \cdots \sigma_{d_{j_{L_B}}} \right).$$

Both of these computations result in the shared secret/exchanged key:

$$(M_A, 1) \cdot (M_B, 1) \star \left(d_{j_1} \cdot d_{j_2} \cdots d_{j_{L_B}}, \sigma_{d_{j_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{j_2}} \cdots \sigma_{d_{j_{L_B}}} \right) \star \left(c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdots c_{i_{L_A}}, \sigma_{c_{i_1}} \cdot \sigma_{c_{i_2}} \cdots \sigma_{c_{i_{L_A}}} \right) = (M_B, 1) \cdot (M_A, 1) \star \left(c_{i_1} \cdot c_{i_2} \cdots c_{i_{L_A}}, \sigma_{d_{i_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{i_2}} \cdots \sigma_{d_{i_{L_B}}} \right) \star \left(d_{j_1} \cdot d_{j_2} \cdots d_{j_{L_B}}, \sigma_{d_{j_1}} \cdot \sigma_{d_{j_2}} \cdots \sigma_{d_{j_{L_B}}} \right).$$

As before, the result of this computation is an $N \times N$ Matrix and a Permutation.

B.2 E-Multiplication

The core of each of these protocols is the concept of E-multiplication and the associated AE key agreement protocol, which is reviewed in this Annex for completeness.

E-multiplication definitions:

- B_N , the Braid group, $\{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{N-1}\}$ the Artin generators,
- $CB(b_i^{\pm 1}) = N$ -variable colored Burau matrix associated with $b_i^{\pm 1}$,
- $F_q =$ finite field of q elements (where $q = p^k$, for p (prime) and $k \geq 1$, e.g. 2^r),
- $S_N =$ permutation group on N symbols; $\sigma \in S_N$, can act on $CB(b_i^{\pm 1})$, the result is denoted $\sigma(CB(b_i^{\pm 1}))$,
- T – values, $\{\tau_1, \tau_2, \dots, \tau_N\} \subseteq F_q$, a collection of invertible elements, the notation $\downarrow_{T\text{-values}}$ indicates replacing variables with the T – values.

E-multiplication: an operation that inputs two ordered pairs,

$$(M, \sigma_0), (\beta, \sigma_\beta),$$

where $M \in GL(N, F_q)$, $\sigma_0 \in S_N$, $\beta \in B_N$, and σ_β is the permutation associated to β , and produces a new ordered pair (M', σ') , where $M' \in GL(N, F_q)$, $\sigma' \in S_N$. The definition of E-multiplication when the braid $\beta = b_i^{\pm 1}$ is given by

$$(M, \sigma_0) \star (b_i^{\pm 1}, \sigma_{b_i^{\pm 1}}) = \left(M \cdot \sigma_0 \left(CB(b_i^{\pm 1}) \right) \downarrow_{T\text{-values}}, \sigma_0 \cdot \sigma_{b_i^{\pm 1}} \right).$$

In the general case, when $\beta = b_{i_1}^{\epsilon_1} b_{i_2}^{\epsilon_2} \cdots b_{i_k}^{\epsilon_k}$, (where $\epsilon_i = \pm 1$) the E-multiplication is executed iteratively:

$$(M, \sigma_0) \star (\beta, \sigma_\beta) = \left(\left((M, \sigma_0) \star (b_{i_1}^{\epsilon_1}, \sigma_{b_{i_1}^{\epsilon_1}}) \right) \star (b_{i_2}^{\epsilon_2}, \sigma_{b_{i_2}^{\epsilon_2}}) \right) \star \cdots \star (b_{i_k}^{\epsilon_k}, \sigma_{b_{i_k}^{\epsilon_k}}).$$

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

As a concrete example, assume we are working in B4F7 with T-values 2 4 6 3. We start have a current matrix and permutation:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 4 & 3 & 5 \\ 2 & 5 & 2 & 6 \\ 3 & 6 & 2 & 1 \\ 2 & 4 & 2 & 5 \end{pmatrix}, (2,4,3,1)$$

Next we want to apply b_2 so we need to use the current permutation and T-values to plug into the appropriate CB matrix:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ t2 & -t2 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 3 & 4 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

When we matrix-multiply within the finite field (F7) and apply the braid twist we wind up with the following matrix and permutation:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 6 & 2 & 0 & 5 \\ 3 & 6 & 0 & 6 \\ 0 & 3 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 2 & 6 & 5 \end{pmatrix}, (2,3,4,1)$$

B.3 AE Implementation Considerations

- There are several parameters in the system that determine the security level: N, q , the number of user conjugates, and the length of the conjugacy set. The lengths of the user conjugates are dependent on the requisite security level. The method used to produce the sets of conjugates has the security level built in as a parameter.
- The size of the search space for Alice's private key is 2^{Nr} where $r = \log_2(q)$. The storage space for the Private key is $N^2r + N \log_2(N)$ bits.
- The size of the search space for Alice's conjugacy set is $(2k)^{L_A}$, which means that if Alice has a larger set of conjugates she can use a shorter conjugacy set. Conversely, if having a smaller set of conjugates is mandated, the private conjugacy set, can be increased in length to maintain security. The storage size for the conjugacy set is approximately twice the size of the individual published conjugates.
- Due to the iterative definition of the E-multiplication, increasing the length of Alice's conjugacy set increases the processing time to compute either Alice's public key, or the shared secret *linearly*. This is a unique feature of the AEKAP.
- There is the option for users to choose new private/public keys at any time. If Alice changes key pairs, while the second user's key pair remains fixed, the resulting shared secret will be different every time. This is another key feature of the AEKAP. Alternately Alice and Bob could use an encrypted nonce to provide replay protection.

Annex C (normative)

AEDH Keyset Parameters

C.1 B10F256 Keyset Parameters

C.1.1 Overview

This keyset provides a security level of 2^{80} using a braid with 10 strands and a field of 256 (2^8). The field F256 is defined using the polynomial $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$. The keyset OID is 1.3.6.1.4.1.44196.1.2.1 which can be used e.g. in a certificate to notify an Interrogator of the keyset in use. When using this keyset the AEDHP parameter is 96 bytes (91 bytes for the matrix and 5 bytes for the permutation).

C.1.2 T-values

This keyset uses the following set of 10 ordered T-values (in decimal):

238, 126, 59, 218, 9, 12, 132, 122, 46, 86

C.1.3 Seed Matrix

This keyset uses the following 10x10 matrix in F256 as the seed matrix (M_*) packed as per Section 2.2.1:

```
50 47 50 7d ae 60 64 6d 03 e5 22 7e a8 b3 60 2a 65 76 18 5e e7 e2 a5
02 aa 49 0f 64 94 8c 0e 28 14 31 07 47 6a d1 3e 36 fd 9b 91 cc dd a3
7f 55 bc 5a a5 d0 11 00 2e 20 6f a7 60 a4 73 5e 3e 82 20 14 e9 74 a4
c0 c3 81 04 13 d9 a9 e3 bd ac 9f 39 13 08 ca 9c d3 25 e9 6a 1c 01
```

C.1.4 Tag Conjugates

This keyset uses the following 32 conjugates to generate keypairs for Tags. To reach the required security level the key generator shall choose at least sixteen (16) of these conjugates and their inverses when building the key. Each conjugate below is packed as per Section 2.2.3 with the first two bytes specifying the number of Artin generators in the braid:

```
0. 02 3b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86 42
9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 b3 a5 6d 7c 4e 95 b5
f0 00 88 64 29 af 7b de f7 bd ef 7b df 07 3e 20 19 4a 74 a9 8f 8c 62
31 04 63 08 42 32 9d 0a 6b de 32 99 0a 6b c2 32 19 0a 6b de e5 35 ed
6b 5a d7 c5 8f 8c 60 c7 c5 ef 8a d4 d7 be 2b 5b 5a d7 bd ef 8c 58 b6
bd 4d 7c 14 c7 c1 8f 63 d6 c7 c1 4c 6a 98 c7 39 f1 6b da b6 b9 08 31
92 64 21 08 42 10 84 21 2b 6b e0 43 21 4c 70 88 64 29 80 11 0c 85 9d
25 39 ce 85 00 43 29 90 85 84 65 3a 14 c6 30 86 4a 98 c1 10 45 3a 54
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
c7 21 44 32 16 c7 a9 8e 21 d0 b3 a1 4c 63 e2 b6 ad af 89 0e 22 10 c9
5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2
9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22 21
d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60
1. 02 55 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f0 6b c6 53 a1 6d 72 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44 31
90 a6 bd ee 32 56 d3 a1 6d 29 4c 95 ad a1 19 0e 94 9d 2b 6b e2 74 ad
af 80 04 43 21 4d 7b de f7 bd ef 7b de f8 39 f1 28 06 41 94 80 19 4a
11 8c 65 3a 54 c7 c6 25 3a 14 c7 c6 30 7c 42 32 99 0a 63 e3 10 8c 86
42 98 e5 b1 f0 63 96 c7 c1 8f 83 e3 16 bd 6d 5b 5a d7 35 ca 6b d6 d5
ad 6b 5a d8 b6 b5 6d 7b df 15 ad 8f 8a 98 f8 c6 0a 6a 98 d7 c1 6d 7b
5f 18 b5 f0 63 9c e6 31 eb 63 9f 17 b5 f1 5b 10 83 19 26 42 10 84 21
08 42 12 b6 be 04 32 14 c7 08 86 42 98 01 10 c8 59 4e 73 a1 40 10 ca
64 21 61 19 4e 85 31 8c 21 92 a6 35 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 20 86
4a 9a 85 34 e8 52 98 f8 19 0a 63 9f 14 ad af 81 04 22 1d 2b 6b 94 d1
90 e9 53 5f 16 be 05 3a 14 c7 c4 c8 53 1a 53 a0 e9 53 1f 17 c5 ae 21
90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c8 64 25 4d 08 88 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85 b5
cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00
2. 02 3f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 cb 62 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44 31
90 a6 bd ee 32 56 d3 94 a7 42 da 64 ad 6d 08 c8 74 ad 67 4a da f8 00
44 32 14 c7 c6 31 8c 63 18 c6 27 4a d8 e7 c5 ef 7c 40 32 0c a4 00 ca
51 88 23 08 46 11 94 e9 53 1f 10 8c a7 42 98 f8 8c a6 42 98 f8 bc 23
21 90 a6 bd f0 63 e3 18 29 8f 8b 1f 05 35 f1 8c 63 18 c1 f0 7c 58 f8
a9 ae 5b 5a f7 b9 af 8c 63 07 c6 2f 7b 5e b6 ad 8b 6a da f3 21 06 32
4c 84 21 08 42 10 84 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 11 0c 85 30 02 21 90 a2 9d
07 21 d0 42 10 c7 49 4e 82 9c e8 50 04 32 99 08 58 46 53 a1 4c 63 08
64 a9 8c 11 04 53 a5 4c 79 cc 85 90 c8 5b 1e 95 b1 e8 53 1a 64 8c 86
32 44 43 21 4c 63 e2 f8 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 6b e2 32 18 87 4a 98 f8
c1 a9 42 9a 74 a9 ae 32 14 c6 30 44 3a 14 d7 c5 ad 78 ca 64 94 c9 53
42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
3. 02 49 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f0 6b c6 53 a1 6d 72 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44 31
90 a6 bd ee 32 56 c2 9c a5 3a 16 d2 99 2b 5b 42 32 1d 2b 59 d2 b6 be
00 11 0c 85 31 f1 8c 63 18 c6 31 89 d2 b6 39 f1 7b df 10 0c 83 29 00
32 94 a7 4a 98 f8 94 e8 53 1f 10 8c a6 42 da f0 8c 86 42 9a f8 b5 8f
8b de d6 bd f1 6b 5a f8 b5 f1 5b 5e b6 bd ef 7a 9a e5 35 ef 7b 96 d7
c6 2c 7c 56 d7 b9 4d 73 5f 05 b5 8f 53 1f 18 35 ee 53 5e b5 b5 eb 32
10 63 24 c8 42 10 84 21 08 42 56 d7 c0 86 42 98 e1 10 c8 53 00 22 19
0a 49 90 92 99 01 19 4c 92 19 0a 32 10 b0 8c a7 42 98 c6 00 44 32 54
c7 31 c0 11 04 53 a1 6c 7a d8 43 21 6c 71 92 a6 38 87 42 ce 85 31 8f
8a da b6 be 24 38 88 43 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 68 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f 02
```


Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

9d 0a 63 e3 13 99 0a 63 4a 74 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b
e2 d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
4. 02 3f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f8 08 86 42 4c 85 31 0a
53 1a f8 19 0a 63 e3 12 9d 2b 6b e2 74 ad af 82 98 f3 a5 6c 7c 0c 85
31 e5 3a 56 c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 a1 6d 7c 44 43 21 4c 7c 0e 93 a5 6d 72
9a f7 10 c6 42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 56 95 88
86 4a 8c 95 a8 44 32 56 b1 94 e9 5b 5f 11 94 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a
f7 bd ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 53 a5 4c 7c 63 11 94 e8 53 1f 11 94 c8
53 1f 07 c5 ef 8c 62 11 90 c9 5b 5a c7 c6 0d 7b e0 f6 3e 0d 7c 5e f8
3e 0a 63 da b5 b5 ad 6a d6 b6 3e 31 8a 98 e7 c6 0d 7b da e5 35 f0 63
54 d7 c5 ab 5b 5f 18 35 ed 5b 5f 17 b9 08 31 92 64 21 08 42 10 84 21
2b 6b e0 43 21 4c 70 88 64 29 80 11 0c 85 a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19 4e
85 31 8c 21 92 a6 35 02 11 4e 95 31 e6 42 86 43 21 6c 7a 56 c7 c5 0a
69 92 32 18 c9 53 5c 43 21 4c 63 5f 07 08 86 41 92 b1 90 c4 3a 54 c7
c6 29 42 9a 74 a9 ae 32 14 c6 30 44 3a 14 d7 c5 ad 78 ca 64 94 c9 53
42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
5. 02 3d b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8 8c
a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63 e2
32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 95 b5 e7
4a da f8 a1 4c 79 d2 b6 3e 06 42 98 f2 9d 2b 63 e2 32 9d 2a 6b d0 b6
be 03 21 90 a6 3e 29 5b 5c a6 bd e2 21 c8 64 29 af 7b 8c 95 b4 e8 5b
4a 53 25 6b 68 46 43 a5 2b 11 0c 95 25 6a 11 0c 83 20 c9 5a 8c 95 9d
29 4a d2 74 9c e9 4a ce 74 ac 65 3a 56 d7 c4 65 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90
a6 bd ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7c 1c f8 84 65 3a 54 c7 c6 25 3a 14 c7 c4 21
19 4c 85 b5 e1 19 0c 95 35 f1 7c 5f 05 31 f1 6b df 15 b5 ee 53 5e f7
c6 31 7b e3 17 bd ef 8c 63 18 c5 ef 4a 98 d3 a1 4a 6a 98 c6 31 8c 63
18 c6 be 04 32 14 c7 08 86 42 98 01 10 c8 50 88 64 19 08 00 ca 64 24
a6 49 90 a0 8c 86 32 10 b0 8c a7 42 98 c6 00 44 32 54 c6 a0 02 20 8a
74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 20 86 4a 9a 85 34 e8 52 98 f8 19 0a 63 9f 11 10 e9
3a 56 d7 c0 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4c 3a 54 d7 c4 e8 5b 5e b6 be 25 32 14 c7
c6 24 32 14 c6 b8 86 42 98 c6 10 44 3a 14 d7 c5 ad 79 92 53 25 4d 08
88 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00
6. 02 4d b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86 42
9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 b3 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19
0a 63 e3 18 c6 31 8c 63 12 9d 2b 63 9f 17 bd f1 00 c8 32 90 03 28 06
52 88 23 29 d2 a6 3e 23 29 d0 a6 3e 23 29 90 a6 3d 8f 83 5e f7 c5 ae
6b de f0 8c 86 42 da f8 b1 f1 8b da d6 b9 af 7c 60 a6 3e 2b 5b 1f 06
be 2f 7c 60 f6 3e 2a 6b e0 b6 bd ed 6b e3 18 ad ae 5b 5e b6 b9 4a 53
1a f8 b5 6d 7c 1a e4 18 c6 49 cc 84 21 08 42 10 84 25 6d 7c 08 64 29
8e 11 0c 85 30 02 21 90 b3 a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19 4e 85 31 8c 21 92
a6 30 44 11 4e 95 31 c4 32 16 c7 19 2a 63 8e 85 14 c8 59 4e 85 31 8f
81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 95 b5 f0 10 88 74 ad ae 53 46 43 a5 4d 7c 5a f8
14 e8 53 1f 13 21 4c 69 4e 83 a5 4c 7c 5f 16 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42
9a f8 b5 af 08 c8 71 10 c8 4a 98 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24
e5 18 00

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

7. 02 29 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8 8c
a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63 e2
32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5 6d
7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 2d 89 5b 5f 12
19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 53 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 bc 86 21 92 b6 9c a7 29
d0 b6 99 2b 5b 42 32 1d 2b 59 d2 b6 be 00 11 0c 85 31 f1 8c 63 18 c6
31 89 d2 b6 39 f1 7b df 10 0c 83 29 00 32 8c 65 29 4a 52 94 21 08 c6
32 94 a7 4a 98 f8 8c 63 08 46 32 9d 0a 63 e2 f1 94 c8 53 5c d7 be 31
8c 42 32 19 0a 6b df 07 3e 31 8c 62 f8 ad 4c 7c 58 f8 31 f0 53 1f 05
b5 cb 6b da f5 35 f1 62 0c 63 24 e6 42 10 84 21 08 42 12 b6 be 04 32
14 c7 08 86 42 98 01 10 c8 51 c8 60 8c 87 11 0e 85 14 c8 42 c2 32 9d
0a 63 18 43 25 4c 6a 00 22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e
85 29 8f 81 90 a6 39 f1 11 0e 93 a5 6d 7c 04 22 1d 2b 6b 94 c3 a5 4d
7c 4e 85 b5 eb 6b e2 53 21 4c 7c 62 43 21 4c 6b 88 64 29 8c 61 04 43
a1 4d 7c 5a d7 99 25 32 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32
4e 51 80
8. 02 3b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86 42
9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 80 04 43 21
4c 7c 63 18 c6 31 8c 62 53 a5 6c 73 e2 f7 be 25 00 c8 32 90 03 28 06
52 8c 63 18 80 11 94 21 18 c2 30 8c a7 4a 98 f8 c4 23 29 d0 a6 bd e1
19 4c 85 b5 af 08 c8 64 ad 4d 7b de f7 ad 6d 7c 58 f8 c1 8e 5b 1f 05
35 f1 8b 1f 15 35 f1 6b de e5 b5 ea 63 5f 16 b5 c8 31 8c 93 99 08 42
10 84 21 08 4a da f8 10 c8 53 1c 22 19 0a 60 04 43 21 44 31 82 32 1c
44 3a 14 53 21 0b 08 ca 74 29 8c 61 0c 95 31 a8 00 88 22 9d 2a 63 96
c7 25 4c 71 d0 a6 14 c8 53 1a 53 a1 4a 63 e0 43 21 4c 73 e2 95 b5 f0
10 88 74 ad ae 53 46 43 a5 4d 7c 5a f8 14 e8 53 1f 13 21 4c 69 4e 83
a5 4c 7c 5f 16 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22 21
d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60
9. 02 41 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8 8c
a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63 e2
32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5 6d
7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c1 af 19 4e 85 b5 c9 5b 5f 12
19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 53 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32
56 b6 84 64 3a 56 95 9d 2b 6b e2 95 b5 f0 00 88 64 29 af 7b de f7 bd
ef 7b df 07 3e 20 19 4a 74 a9 8f 88 c6 32 9d 0a 63 e2 10 84 21 19 4c
85 31 cf 88 46 43 21 4c 72 d8 f8 31 f1 8c 1c f8 ad af 5b 56 b5 b5 af
72 9a e5 35 ca 62 98 d7 bd ca 6b de a6 b9 4d 7a da d5 ad 6c 5b 5e b6
bd 6d 7c 62 b6 bd ea 6b dc b6 bd af 7a da f8 3e 0e 63 1c e7 c5 ed 7a
da e4 20 c6 49 90 84 21 08 42 10 84 ad af 81 0c 85 31 c2 21 90 a6 00
44 32 16 74 94 e7 3a 14 01 0c a6 42 16 11 94 e8 53 18 c2 19 2a 63 04
41 14 e9 53 1c 85 10 c8 5b 1e a6 38 87 42 ce 85 31 8f 8a da b6 be 24
38 88 43 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 68 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f 02 9d 0a 63 e3 13
99 0a 63 4a 74 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 86 42
54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
10. 02 35 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 89 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 35 ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7b e0 e7 c4 a0 19 06 52 00 65 29
4a 52 94 e9 53 1f 18 84 65 3a 14 d7 bd ee 08 ca 64 29 af 78 46 43 25
6d 6b 56 d5 b5 f1 8a da e6 bd ef 7b df 15 b5 8b 6b 5a c7 c6 0c 6b dc
a6 bd f1 5b 5e f7 c5 ef 8a 98 f8 29 8c 63 5f 05 b5 ea 63 5c 84 18 c9
32 10 84 21 08 42 10 95 b5 f0 21 90 a6 38 44 32 14 c0 08 86 42 8a 73
a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19 4e 85 31 8c 21 92 a6 35 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 42
d8 e3 20 86 4a 9a 85 34 e8 52 98 f8 19 0a 63 9f 14 ad af 81 04 22 1d
2b 6b 94 d1 90 e9 53 5f 16 be 05 3a 14 c7 c4 c8 53 1a 53 a0 e9 53 1f
17 c5 ae 21 90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c8 64 25 4d 08 88 74 a9 ae
42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00
11. 02 37 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 c3 29 d2 b6 3e 0d 78 ca 74 2d 89 5b 5f
12 19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 6b de 22 19 0a 42 9a f7 bd 6c 29 ca 53 a1 6d
29 92 b5 b4 23 21 d2 b5 88 86 4a 8c 95 a8 44 32 56 94 a5 2b 4a 56 74
9c e9 5a ce 94 ad 63 29 d2 b6 be 23 29 d2 b6 be 00 11 0c 85 35 ef 7b
de f7 bd ef 7b e0 e7 c4 23 29 d2 a6 3e 21 19 4e 85 31 f1 7c 42 32 99
0a 63 e2 d0 8c 86 42 d8 f8 31 f1 82 98 f8 c6 2d 5a d6 c7 c5 ad 63 e3
06 be 0a 63 e2 d7 bd 6d 7b 5f 14 29 66 42 16 85 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 6d
7c 08 64 29 8e 11 0c 85 30 02 21 90 b3 a0 02 21 c8 72 1c 87 42 82 22
14 c8 42 c2 32 9d 0a 63 18 43 25 4c 60 04 41 14 e9 53 1c 85 b1 c9 53
0e 85 31 85 32 14 c7 3c a6 4a 98 c7 c0 86 42 98 e7 c4 e9 5a 56 d7 c0
42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 3a 16 d7 ad af 89 4c 85 31 f1 89 0c
85 31 ae 21 90 a6 31 84 11 0e 85 35 f1 6b 5e 64 94 c9 53 42 22 1d 2a
6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
12. 02 21 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 2d 89 5b 5f
12 19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 53 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5
32 56 b6 84 64 3a 56 95 9d 2b 6b e2 95 b5 f0 00 88 64 29 af 7b de f7
bd ef 7b df 07 3e 20 19 4a 74 a9 8f 88 c6 32 9d 0a 6b e2 10 84 21 08
42 10 84 23 29 90 a6 3e 2d 7b 9a f0 8c 86 42 9a f8 c6 31 8a d8 b6 2d
8f 8a d8 b6 3e 2f 7b e2 b5 31 f0 5b 5e f8 ad 8f 8a 9a f8 b5 eb 6b e0
a5 29 8d 7c 5a b6 be 08 41 8c 93 21 08 42 10 84 21 09 5b 5f 02 19 0a
63 84 43 21 4c 00 88 64 28 a7 3a 14 01 0c a6 42 16 11 94 e8 53 18 c2
19 2a 63 50 22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e 85 29 8f 81
90 a6 39 f1 4a da f8 10 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0 53 a1
4c 7c 4c 85 31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2
d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
13. 02 1b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 cf 80 ca 74 a9 af 88 ca 74 2d 89 5b 5f
12 19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 6b de 22 19 08 53 5e f7 25 6d 3a 16 d2 94 c9
5a da 11 90 e9 49 d2 b6 be 27 4a da f8 00 44 32 14 d7 bd ef 7b de f7
bd ef 83 9f 12 80 64 19 48 01 94 a3 18 ca 52 9d 2a 63 e3 12 9d 0a 63
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
e0 f0 8c a6 42 98 f8 bc 23 21 92 b6 b5 cd 7b de f7 bd ca 53 5e d6 b5
ad 6b e2 c7 ad 8b 63 e0 a6 bd f0 72 d8 f5 b5 8e 7c 56 d7 c6 2f 6a da
f8 be 2d 6b e0 84 18 c9 32 10 84 21 08 42 10 95 b5 f0 21 90 a6 38 44
32 14 c0 08 86 42 8a 73 a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19 4e 85 31 8c 21 92 a6
35 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 20 86 4a 9a 85 34 e8 52 98 f8 ad af 89
0e 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4
e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90
95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60
14.      02 49 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 b3 a5 6d 7c 00 22
19 0a 63 e3 18 c6 31 8c 63 12 9d 2b 63 9f 17 bd f1 00 c8 32 90 02 19
4a 51 8c 81 19 4e 95 31 f1 08 ca 74 29 af 8b e2 11 94 c8 53 5e 11 90
c8 53 5f 18 b5 af 7b df 18 ad ae 5b 5c d7 bd ee 53 5e f6 ad af 8a d8
f8 c5 4c 7c 14 c7 c5 6c 7c 60 d7 c1 4d 53 1f 16 b1 f0 6b 96 d7 a9 af
82 da e6 a9 8d 72 96 d7 ac c8 41 8c 93 21 08 42 10 84 21 09 5b 5f 02
19 0a 63 84 43 21 4c 00 88 64 2c e8 50 04 32 99 08 58 46 53 a1 4c 63
08 64 a9 8d 40 88 22 9d 2a 63 96 c7 25 4c 71 0e 85 30 a6 42 9a 53 a1
4a 63 e2 b6 be 22 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29 a3 21 d2 a6 be 2d 7c 0a
74 29 8f 8c 4e 64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af
8b 5a f0 8c 87 11 0c 84 a9 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51
80
15.      02 51 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 89 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 35 ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7b e0 e7 c4 a0 19 06 52 00 65 08
c6 40 8c 65 28 ca 74 a9 8f 88 46 53 a1 4c 7c 63 11 94 c8 53 1e 11 90
c8 5b 1e b6 3e 0a 63 96 c7 c1 8e 7a 98 e6 3e 0c 7c 14 c7 b1 f0 63 d8
f8 31 f1 6b d6 d5 ad 6c 52 da f5 35 cb 6b da f6 ad af 8c 58 f8 39 cf
8b d6 d7 b9 6d 7a da f8 39 f1 7b 5f 15 b1 08 31 92 64 21 08 42 10 84
21 2b 6b e0 43 21 4c 70 88 64 29 80 11 0c 85 94 e7 3a 14 01 0c a6 42
16 11 94 e8 53 18 c2 19 2a 63 04 41 14 e9 53 1c 85 10 c8 5b 1e a6 38
87 42 ce 85 31 8f 8a da b6 be 24 38 88 43 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 68 c8
74 a9 af 8b 5f 02 9d 0a 63 e3 13 99 0a 63 4a 74 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a
52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6
30 44 32 4e 51 80
16.      02 39 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a7 19 4c 95 b1 f0 3a 54 d7 08 86 42 98 85 30
c8 42 54 d7 c1 4c 7c 62 53 a5 2b 6b e0 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56
c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 a1 6d 7c 48 64 29 8f 8a 56 d7 29 af 78 88 72 19 0a
6b de e3 25 6d 3a 16 d2 94 c9 5a da 11 90 e9 4a ce 95 b5 f1 3a 56 d7
c0 02 21 90 a6 bd ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7c 1c f8 80 64 19 48 01 94 83 28
c6 51 94 e9 53 1f 12 9d 0a 63 e3 11 94 c8 5b 1c f8 31 f1 88 46 43 21
4c 7c 56 b5 ad 6b 6b da f6 b5 ad 73 5f 18 ad ad 7b dc a6 a9 ae 5b 5e
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

d7 b5 f1 63 e3 06 39 cf 82 9a a6 31 ae 5b 5f 15 b1 08 31 92 64 21 08
42 10 84 21 2b 6b e0 43 21 4c 70 88 64 29 80 11 0c 85 94 e8 29 ce 85
00 43 29 90 85 84 65 3a 14 c6 30 86 4a 98 c1 10 45 3a 54 c7 21 6c 72
54 c3 a1 4c 61 4c 85 31 cf 29 92 a6 31 f1 4a da b1 10 86 4a da f8 ad
ae 11 0c 85 29 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0 53 a1 4c 7c 62 73 21 4c 69 4e
83 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87
4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80

17. 02 3b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 80 04 43
21 4c 7c 63 18 c6 31 8c 62 53 a5 6c 73 e2 f7 be 25 00 c8 32 90 03 29
4a 52 94 a7 4a 98 f8 84 65 3a 14 c7 c4 65 32 14 c7 c1 f1 08 c8 64 29
ae 6b e0 b6 39 f0 63 e3 18 3e 0b 63 e0 d7 c1 f0 7c 63 18 b5 ed 73 5e
f7 bd ef 7b de e6 bd ed 6b 5c b6 be 2b 6a d6 a4 18 c6 49 cc 84 21 08
42 10 84 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 11 0c 85 30 02 21 90 a3 1d 25 39 d0 53
94 a7 49 ce 85 00 43 29 90 85 84 65 3a 14 c6 30 86 4a 98 d4 08 82 29
d2 a6 39 6c 72 54 c7 1d 0a 61 4c 85 31 a5 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 10
c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98
d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22
21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60

18. 02 49 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 cb 62 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44
31 90 a6 bd ee 32 56 c2 9c a5 3a 16 d2 99 2b 5b 42 32 1d 2b 59 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 31 f1 8c 63 18 c6 31 89 d2 b6 39 f1 7b df 10 0c 83 29
00 32 94 63 18 c2 10 8c a5 29 d2 a6 3e 31 08 46 31 84 61 18 46 53 a1
4c 7c 42 32 99 0b 6b 5a 11 90 c8 5b 1f 18 a9 8f 83 e0 a6 3e 2d 7b de
f7 c6 2b 5b 16 c7 c5 4c 7c 14 c7 b1 f0 7c 18 e7 b1 f1 6b e2 b6 bd ca
5b 5e b3 21 06 32 4c 84 21 08 42 10 84 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 11 0c 85
30 02 21 90 b3 a4 a5 3a 0a 73 a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19 4e 85 31 8c 21
92 a6 35 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 25 4c 3a 14 53 21 4c 69 4e 85 29
8f 81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 d7 c0 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0
53 a1 4c 7c 4c 85 31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a
6b e2 d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51
80

19. 02 2f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 89 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 35 ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7b e0 e7 c4 a0 19 4a 31 04 63 19
4a 52 9d 2a 63 e0 11 8c 21 18 46 11 94 e8 53 1f 17 bc 23 29 90 b6 b5
af 78 46 43 21 4d 7c 1a f7 ad ad 6b 5a f8 3d 6b 5a d8 e7 c6 0d 7c 5f
05 31 8f 63 e0 c7 c1 aa 63 1a e5 b5 f1 5b 10 83 19 26 42 10 84 21 08
42 12 b6 be 04 32 14 c7 08 86 42 98 01 10 c8 59 4e 82 9c e8 50 04 32

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

99 08 58 46 53 a1 4c 63 08 64 a9 8d 40 88 22 9d 2a 63 96 c7 25 4c 71
d0 a6 14 c8 53 1a 53 a1 4a 63 e2 b6 be 22 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29
a3 21 d2 a6 be 2d 7c 0a 74 29 8f 8c 4e 64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88
64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af 8b 5a f2 19 09 53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d
73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00

20. 02 2f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 95 b5
e7 4a da f8 a1 4c 79 d2 b6 3e 06 42 98 f2 9d 2b 63 e0 d7 8c a7 42 da
e4 ad af 80 c8 64 29 8f 89 d2 b6 b9 4d 7b c4 43 19 0a 6b de e3 25 6c
29 ca 53 a1 6d 29 92 b5 b4 23 21 d2 b5 9d 2b 6b e2 95 b5 f0 00 88 64
29 af 7b de f7 bd ef 7b df 07 3e 20 19 06 52 00 64 19 00 32 84 23 19
42 10 8c 61 08 42 11 8c 21 08 42 32 84 65 3a 54 c7 c6 21 19 4e 85 35
ef 7c 42 32 99 0b 68 46 43 21 6c 5b 1f 06 3e 30 5b 1f 17 31 af 7b 5a
d7 be 2d 7a 9a f8 2d af 8a d8 f8 a9 8c 6b 94 b6 bd 48 41 8c 93 21 08
42 10 84 21 09 5b 5f 02 19 0a 63 84 43 21 4c 00 88 64 2c e8 50 04 32
99 08 58 46 53 a1 4c 63 08 64 a9 8d 40 8a 74 a9 83 29 d0 a6 39 0b 63
8c 95 31 c4 3a 14 d3 21 4c 69 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 88 84 32 56 d7 08
86 42 94 a6 8c 87 4a 9a f8 b5 f0 29 d0 a6 3e 31 39 90 a6 35 c6 42 98
c6 18 44 3a 14 d7 c5 ad 78 ca 64 94 c9 53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d
73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00

21. 02 43 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 89 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 35 ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7b e0 e7 c4 a0 19 06 52 8c 65 3a
54 c7 c0 01 18 42 10 84 23 08 ca 74 29 8f 8c 46 53 21 4c 7c 1f 18 c4
23 21 90 b6 3e 0c 7c 56 d7 ad af 5a 9a f7 b9 6c 5b 5e d7 35 4d 72 da
f7 c1 8e 63 9f 15 ad 4c 7c 62 d7 b5 6d 7b d6 d7 c6 0a 6b e3 06 35 f0
52 da b6 b9 08 31 92 64 21 08 42 10 84 21 2b 6b e0 43 21 4c 70 88 64
29 80 11 0c 85 10 a6 29 ce 85 00 43 29 90 85 84 65 3a 14 c6 30 86 4a
98 d4 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 0b 63 8c 82 19 2a 6a 14 d3 a1 4a 63 e0 64 29
8e 7c 52 b6 be 04 10 88 74 ad ae 53 46 43 a5 4d 7c 5a f8 14 e8 53 1f
13 21 4c 69 4e 83 a5 4c 7c 5f 16 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af
21 90 95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60

22. 02 4b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f0 6b c6 53 a1 6d 72 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44
31 90 a6 bd ee 32 56 c2 9c a5 3a 16 d2 99 2b 5b 42 32 1d 2b 59 d2 b6
be 29 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7 bd ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 01 90 65 20
04 01 90 23 08 42 32 94 a3 29 42 32 9d 2a 63 e3 10 8c a7 42 9a f7 84
65 32 14 d7 bd f1 63 e2 11 90 c9 5a 98 f8 29 8c 7b 1f 06 be 2f 7c 1c
f8 b5 ef 7b d4 d7 c1 6d 6b e3 18 c6 0f 5b 1f 18 c5 4d 7b df 18 be 0a
63 9c c6 3d 6c 73 e2 e5 b5 f1 5b 5a e4 20 c6 49 90 84 21 08 42 10 84
ad af 81 0c 85 31 c2 21 90 a6 00 44 32 16 73 a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19
4e 85 31 8c 21 92 a6 35 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 20 86 4a 9a 85 34
e8 52 98 f8 ad af 89 0e 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6
42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93
94 60

23. 02 49 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 bc e9 5b 5f 04 ad af 81 0c 85 2d 8f 8c 04 53 a1 4d 7c
10 a6 38 23 29 92 b6 3e 23 21 d2 a6 b8 44 32 12 64 29 88 52 98 d7 c0
c8 53 1f 18 94 e9 5b 5e 74 ad af 8a 14 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 64 29 8f 29 d2
b6 3e 23 29 d2 a6 bd 0b 6b e0 32 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 b1 10 c9 52 56 a1
10 c9 52 12 b5 19 2b 5a ce 93 9d 2b 19 4e 95 b5 f1 19 4e 95 b5 f0 00
88 64 29 af 7b de f7 bd ef 7b df 07 3e 21 19 4e 95 31 f1 29 d0 a6 3e
31 08 ca 64 2d 8f 88 46 43 25 4c 7c 1f 18 b5 ed 6b 5e e6 bd ee 53 1a
e5 b5 ad 6b 9a f6 bd ad 7b 56 d7 b5 6d 7c 58 f8 ad ae 53 14 c5 35 ed
72 94 a6 35 f1 6a da f8 35 c6 41 8c 64 9c c8 42 10 84 21 08 42 56 d7
c0 86 42 98 e1 10 c8 53 00 22 19 0b 3a 14 01 0c a6 42 16 11 94 e8 53
18 c2 19 2a 63 04 41 14 e9 53 1c 85 10 c8 5b 1e a6 38 87 42 ce 85 31
8f 81 90 a6 39 f1 4a d2 b6 be 04 10 88 74 ad ae 53 46 43 a5 4d 7c 4e
85 b5 eb 6b e2 53 21 4c 7c 62 43 21 4c 6b 88 64 29 8c 61 04 43 a1 4d
7c 5a d7 99 25 32 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51
80

24. 02 27 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 a1 6d 7c 48
64 29 8f 8a 56 d7 29 af 78 88 72 19 0a 6b de e3 25 6d 3a 16 d2 94 c9
5a da 11 90 e9 49 d2 b6 be 27 4a da f8 00 44 32 14 d7 bd ef 7b de f7
bd ef 83 9f 12 80 64 19 48 01 94 a4 19 46 31 84 23 29 d2 a6 3e 25 3a
14 c7 c4 65 32 14 d0 8c 86 4a 9a f7 c1 f1 6b da d7 31 af 7b da e5 35
4d 72 9a f7 bd ef 7b de a6 be 0b 63 e2 b6 be 0a 63 e0 b6 be 31 7c 60
d7 c5 6b 6b e3 05 31 8d 7b 56 d6 b9 08 31 92 64 21 08 42 10 84 21 2b
6b e0 43 21 4c 70 88 64 29 80 11 0c 85 9c e8 50 04 32 99 08 58 46 53
a1 4c 63 08 64 a9 8d 40 88 22 9d 2a 63 96 c7 25 4c 71 0e 85 30 a6 42
9a 53 a1 4a 63 e2 b6 be 22 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29 a3 21 d2 a6 be
2d 7c 0a 74 29 8f 8c 4e 64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a
64 29 af 8b 5a f2 19 09 53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9
39 46 00

25. 02 53 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f0 6b c6 53 a1 6d 72 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44
31 90 a6 bd ef 21 88 64 ad a7 29 ca 74 2d a6 4a d6 d0 8c 87 4a d6 74
ad af 80 04 43 21 4c 7c 63 18 c6 31 8c 62 74 ad 8e 7c 5e f7 c4 03 20
ca 40 0c a3 19 4e 95 31 f1 88 46 53 a1 4d 7b df 10 8c a6 42 da d0 8c
86 42 da f5 35 ca 6a 9a e5 31 aa 6b de d5 b5 8a 5b 56 b5 b5 ed 7a da
f5 b5 eb 6b e2 b6 3e 30 63 96 c7 c1 f0 63 9e d6 b5 8f 82 98 f8 2d 8f
83 1f 15 b5 eb 6b d4 c6 bd eb 53 1a f8 31 ae 41 8c 64 9c c8 42 10 84
21 08 42 56 d7 c0 86 42 98 e1 10 c8 53 00 22 19 0a 29 ce 85 00 43 29
90 85 84 65 3a 14 c6 30 86 4a 98 c1 10 45 3a 54 c7 21 44 32 16 c7 a9
8e 21 d0 b3 a1 4c 63 e2 b6 ad af 89 0e 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a
32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7
31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60
26. 02 41 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 cb 62 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44
32 14 64 29 af 7b d6 d3 a1 6d 29 4c 95 ad a1 19 0e 94 9c e9 5b 5f 13
a5 6d 70 04 43 21 4d 7b de f7 bd ef 7b de f8 39 f1 28 06 41 94 80 19
06 53 a5 4c 7c 4a 74 29 8e 78 ca 64 2c 23 21 90 a6 3d 6d 63 e2 a6 bd
f0 53 5e f7 c1 f1 5b 5e b5 b5 8b 6b de b6 2d 8b 6b df 18 ad ae 53 5e
f7 29 af 7b d6 d6 be 0a 63 e3 18 35 ef 7c 62 d7 b5 f0 7a d8 e7 c5 ed
7a da e4 20 c6 49 90 84 21 08 42 10 84 ad af 81 0c 85 31 c2 21 90 a6
00 44 32 16 74 94 e7 3a 14 01 0c a6 42 16 11 94 e8 53 18 c2 19 2a 63
50 22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 90
e2 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29 a3 21 d2 a6 be 2d 7c 0a 74 29 8f 8c 4e
64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af 8b 5a f0 8c 87
11 0c 84 a9 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
27. 02 4d b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 74 ad af 89 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 35 ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7b e0 e7 c4 a0 19 06 52 00 65 29
d2 a6 3e 31 08 ca 74 29 af 78 42 10 8c a6 42 9a f0 8c 86 42 da f8 b1
ea 63 e0 c7 c1 4c 72 d8 f8 31 eb 63 e3 06 3e 2d 72 96 d7 ad ad 6b 5c
a6 bd eb 6b 5a d7 b5 ed 7c 62 b5 b5 8b 6a da b5 b5 ef 8b 56 d6 3e 0c
7c 5c a5 2d af 8a 98 d7 21 06 32 4c 84 21 08 42 10 84 25 6d 7c 08 64
29 8e 11 0c 85 30 02 21 90 a2 9c e8 50 04 32 99 08 58 46 53 a1 4c 63
08 64 a9 8c 11 04 53 a5 4c 72 14 43 21 6c 7a 98 e2 1d 0b 3a 14 c6 3e
2b 6a da 43 88 84 32 56 d7 c5 ae 11 0c 85 29 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 3a 16
d7 ad af 89 4c 85 31 f1 89 48 64 29 8c 31 d2 a6 bd ae 21 90 a5 29 82
29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c8 64 25 4d 08 88 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43
24 e5 18 00
28. 02 2f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 b3 a5 6d 7c 4e 95
b5 f0 00 88 64 29 af 7b de f7 bd ef 7b df 07 3e 20 19 06 52 00 65 29
4e 95 31 f1 19 4e 85 31 f1 88 ca 64 29 8f 8c 42 32 19 0b 6b 1f 16 b1
f1 53 1f 16 bd af 7b 5e f6 bd ad 7b da f7 b5 ca 6b e2 b6 b5 ef 8c 56
b6 b5 ad 5b 56 d7 c1 8c 73 e0 a6 35 f1 6a da e4 20 c6 49 90 84 21 08
42 10 84 ad af 81 0c 85 31 c2 21 90 a6 00 44 32 16 74 28 02 19 4c 84
2c 23 29 d0 a6 31 a2 21 92 a6 35 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 5b 1c 95 31 c7 42
98 53 21 4c 69 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 88 84 32 56 d7 08 86 42 94 a6 8c
87 4a 9a f8 b5 f0 29 d0 a6 3e 31 39 90 a6 34 a7 41 d2 a6 bd ae 21 90
a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c2 32 1c 44 32 12 a6 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d
73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
```


Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

29. 02 41 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 bc e9 5b 5f 04 ad af 81 0c 85 2d 8f 8c 04 53 a1 4d 7c
10 a6 38 23 29 92 b6 3e 23 21 d2 a6 b8 44 32 12 64 29 88 52 98 d7 c0
c8 53 1f 18 94 e9 5b 5e 74 ad af 8a 14 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 64 29 8f 29 d2
b6 3e 23 29 d2 a6 bd 0b 6b e0 32 19 0a 63 e2 95 b5 ca 6b de 22 1c 86
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 84 64 3a 52 b1 10 c9 52 56 a1
10 c9 59 d2 95 ad 67 4a 56 b5 ac 65 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90 a6 3e 31 8c
63 18 c6 31 08 ca 74 ad 8e 7c 5e f7 c4 23 29 d2 a6 3e 31 08 ca 74 29
8f 83 e2 11 94 c8 53 1f 10 8c 86 42 9a f8 ad ae 5b 5e d7 c6 2d 7b e3
18 c6 0d 7b e3 18 c6 31 8c 62 f8 c5 af 6b 94 c5 29 aa 63 5f 16 bc e8
52 cc 84 2d 0a 52 94 a5 29 4a 52 da f8 10 c8 53 1c 22 19 0a 60 04 43
21 40 11 0c 72 1c 87 42 82 22 14 c8 42 c2 32 9d 0a 63 18 43 25 4c 60
04 41 14 e9 53 1c 85 10 c8 5b 1e a6 38 87 42 ce 85 31 8f 8a da b6 be
24 38 88 43 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 68 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f 02 9d 0a 63 e3
13 99 0a 63 4a 74 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 86
42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80

30. 02 3b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21
4a 63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e
95 b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 cb 62 56 d7 c4 86 42 98 f8 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44
31 90 a6 bd ee 32 56 d3 94 a7 42 da 64 ad 6d 08 c8 74 ad 67 4a da f8
00 44 32 14 c7 c6 31 8c 63 18 c6 27 4a d8 e7 c5 ef 7c 40 32 0c a4 00
ca 52 84 63 20 46 32 9d 2a 63 e2 53 a1 4c 7c 5e f0 84 65 32 14 d7 84
64 32 16 d7 c5 8f 8b e2 b6 bd af 7b de d7 2d ae 5b 5f 18 b1 f0 7c 63
18 31 f1 6b 58 f8 c6 2b 5a 9a f7 29 af 53 5f 05 2d af 8b 5e a6 35 ca
5b 5e a4 18 c6 49 cc 84 21 08 42 10 84 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 11 0c 85
30 02 21 90 b3 a1 40 10 ca 64 21 61 19 4e 85 31 8c 21 92 a6 35 02 20
8a 74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 20 86 4a 9a 85 34 e8 52 98 f8 ad af 89 0e 22 10
c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98
d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22
21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60

31. 02 3b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 bc e9 5b 5f 04 ad af 81 0c 85 2d 8f 8c 04 53 a1 4d 7c
10 a6 38 23 29 92 b6 3e 23 21 d2 a6 b8 44 32 12 64 29 88 52 98 d7 c0
c8 53 1f 18 94 e9 3a 56 d7 c5 4c 79 d2 b6 3e 08 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46
53 a5 4d 72 d8 95 b5 f1 21 90 a6 3e 27 4a da e5 35 ef 11 0c 64 29 af
7b c8 62 19 2b 69 ca 72 9d 0b 69 92 b5 b4 23 21 d2 b5 9d 2b 6b e0 01
10 c8 53 1f 18 c6 31 8c 63 18 9d 2b 63 9f 17 bd f1 00 ca 51 88 23 20
46 52 84 21 18 ca 51 94 a3 29 d2 a6 3e 31 19 4e 85 31 f1 19 4c 85 31
f1 7b 5a f0 8c 86 4a 9a f7 29 af 83 1f 06 b9 af 7b df 18 b5 ef 7b 5a
f7 b5 ed 7a d6 b5 a9 06 31 92 73 21 08 42 10 84 21 09 5b 5f 02 19 0a
63 84 43 21 4c 00 88 64 28 87 29 0c 74 9d 04 21 0c 74 1d 25 3a 4e 85
00 43 29 90 a4 2c 23 29 d0 a6 31 84 32 54 c6 08 85 3a 54 c7 21 6c 72
54 c3 a1 4c 61 4c 85 31 cf 29 92 a6 31 f0 21 90 a6 39 f0 11 4c 95 94
e9 59 d2 b6 be 02 21 d2 b6 b9 4c 3a 54 d7 c5 af 81 4e 85 31 f1 89 90
a6 35 c6 42 98 c6 18 44 3a 14 d7 c5 ad 78 ca 01 94 c9 21 92 32 99 2a
61 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

C.1.5 Interrogator Conjugates

This keyset uses the following 32 conjugates to generate keypairs for Interrogators. To reach the required security level the key generator shall choose at least sixteen (16) of these conjugates and their inverses when building the key. Each conjugate below is packed as per Section 2.2.3 with the first two bytes specifying the number of Artin generators in the braid:

- 0. 02 3f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 04 65 3a 14 d7 c4 65 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d 2b
6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98 e7
c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 69 53 5f 03 21 4d 11 0c 85 31 f0 21
d2 74 ad af 29 d0 a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 11 90
c9 5a d2 b6 bc e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 98 f8 c6 31 8c 63 18 c6 25 3a 56
d7 be 0f 8b e2 95 31 f1 82 98 e7 3e 31 53 1f 18 c6 31 8c 63 16 b5 af
7c 62 f6 be 08 53 1f 18 c6 31 8a d8 f8 31 f1 82 9a b5 35 ef 7b dc a6
bd f0 7c 62 b6 ad 6b 5a d6 b5 ad 6d 62 d8 f8 bd ee 53 5f 05 31 f1 6b
d4 c6 b9 4c 53 18 d5 ad 4d 7c 5e d7 ad 6d 7a da f8 21 0a 52 10 a5 29
4a 52 94 a5 29 6d 7c 0c 85 10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63 04 43 25 4c 6a 00
22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 0c 87
11 08 64 ad ae 11 0c 85 29 4d 18 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f 02 9d 0a 63 e3 05
9c c8 53 1a e3 21 4c 63 04 43 a1 4d 7c 5a d7 8c a0 19 4c 92 19 23 29
92 a6 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
- 1. 02 23 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8 8c
a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63 e2
32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5 6d
7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 2d 89 5b 5f 12
19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 53 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a d8 53 94 e8 5b
4a 64 ad 6d 7c 42 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7 bd
ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 be 2a 6b de e5 b5 f0 4a d6 c5 b5 af 73 1a
f7 bd ab 6b d6 d7 ad af 8c 62 b6 be 2a 63 e3 05 31 f0 7c 5f 15 b5 ae
53 5f 15 31 f0 7c 56 a6 3e 2d 7b 5a d6 b5 cd 73 5f 18 3e 31 8b de f7
c6 30 53 18 f8 39 cf 82 98 c6 29 ae 53 54 d7 2d af 8a da f6 bd 6d 7b
e0 84 29 48 42 94 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42 ce 85 31
8c 11 0c 95 31 a8 00 88 22 9d 2a 63 90 b6 38 c8 21 92 a6 a1 4d 3a 14
a6 3e 06 42 98 e7 c5 2b 6b e0 22 08 44 3a 56 d7 29 a3 19 0e 95 35 f1
6b e0 c2 9d 0a 63 e3 13 21 4c 6b 8c 85 31 8c 11 0e 85 35 f1 6b da e6
8c a6 49 4c 95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60
- 2. 02 4f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 98 85 35 e7 4a da f8 ad af 81 0c 85 2d 8f 8c 04 53 a1 4d 7c 10
a6 38 23 29 92 b6 3e 23 21 d2 a6 bc e9 5b 5f 01 10 c6 42 da f8 19 0a
6a 98 e2 18 e9 5b 1f 04 29 8f 63 e2 74 a9 ae 5b 4c 95 b5 ef 19 0e 22
18 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 79 4e 95 35 ed 7c 04 43 21 44 32 14 c7 08 87 11
0c 85 31 f1 5b 5e a6 bd ca 6b de e4 ad a5 3a 16 d2 94 c9 5a da f0 8c
87 4a d2 b3 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 63 e3 18 c6 31 8c 63 18 9d 2b 6b df
07 c5 f1 4a 98 f8 c1 4c 73 9f 18 a9 8f 83 e2 f7 bd f1 6b 5f 04 29 8f
8a d8 f8 c5 6c 5b 5a f5 b5 ab 5a da f8 c6 2f 8b e2 b6 b5 ad 7b de f8
29 ae 53 5e f6 b5 af 7c 56 d5 b1 f0 53 1f 16 bd ee 6b de e5 35 f0 5b
1f 18 c1 8f 5b 1f 17 35 ea 6b 9a f8 b5 f0 53 18 f6 39 cf 8a da f5 b5
ca 6a 9a f8 29 8a 63 5e b6 21 4a 52 10 b4 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4b 6b e0
63 19 0a 21 90 85 9d 0a 63 18 22 19 2a 63 50 01 10 42 29 d2 a6 39 0b

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

63 8c 82 19 2a 6a 14 d3 a1 4a 63 e2 b6 be 03 21 c4 42 19 2b 6b 84 43
21 4a 53 5f 03 a5 4c 7c 60 d4 a1 4d 18 8a 74 a9 ae 32 14 c6 30 44 3a
14 d7 c5 ad 78 ca 64 94 c9 53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10
c9 39 46 00

3. 02 2b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42 98
e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 88 63 a1 6d
79 92 b6 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f1 32 14 c7 b1 f0 32 14 c7 3e 03 29 d2 a6
be 23 29 d2 85 b5 f0 32 14 d1 10 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 73 5e e4 29 af 7b
92 b6 9c a7 42 da 53 25 6b 6b c2 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90 a6 3e
31 8c 63 18 c6 31 89 4e 95 b5 ef 83 e2 f8 a5 4c 7c 60 a6 39 f1 7b df
15 b5 ed 7b 98 d7 bd ed 6b da d7 b5 ed 7c 63 18 b5 cc 42 9a e6 be 31
5b 5c d7 ad 8b 6b 5a f8 ad ae 6a 9a f7 2d ad 6b d6 b6 bd ed 7c 58 f8
c6 2b 63 9f 05 35 ee 63 1a f8 29 4a 53 56 a6 be 2d 7a d6 d7 ad af 82
10 a5 21 0a 52 94 a5 29 4a 52 96 d7 c0 c8 51 08 43 21 0b 3a 14 c6 30
44 32 54 c6 a0 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 5b 1c 95 31 c7 42 98 53 21 4c 69 4e
85 29 8f 81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 d7 c0 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1
6b e0 53 a1 4c 7c 4c 85 31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2 19 0a 52 98 22
99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 23 21 c4 43 21 2a 61 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11
0c 93 94 60

4. 02 43 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a e1 10 c8 49 90 a6 21 4a
63 5f 03 21 4c 7c 62 53 a4 e9 5b 5f 15 31 e7 4a d8 f8 21 4c 79 4e 95
b1 f1 19 4e 95 35 e8 5b 5f 12 19 0a 63 e0 74 9d 2b 6b 94 d7 bc 44 31
90 a6 bd ee 32 56 c2 9c a7 42 da 53 25 6b 6b d2 b6 be 21 19 4e 73 a5
6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7 bd ef 7b de f7 c1 cf 8b e2 f8 a5 4d 7b 94
c6 bd ad 6b da f8 c5 8f 8b df 06 3e 2d 7b 9a f7 c5 8f 83 1f 16 be 2d
72 14 d7 ad ad 7c 58 f8 31 f0 7c 58 f8 c5 f1 7c 14 d7 bd ef 8a d8 f8
31 ec 7c 1a f8 29 8f 5b 1f 15 31 f0 7c 1f 18 c6 31 6b de d6 be 0a 63
e3 15 b5 ef 7c 5f 06 35 4c 63 d8 f8 31 89 53 50 a6 31 4a 6a 98 c6 31
8c 63 18 c6 be 08 53 0c 85 10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63 04 43 25 4c 6a 00
22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e 85 29 8f 81 90 a6 39 f1
4a da f8 10 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0 53 a1 4c 7c 4c 85
31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 23 21
c4 43 21 2a 61 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60

5. 02 3d b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 90 23 29 d0 a6 be 25 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d 2b
6b e0 22 19 0a 32 14 43 1d 0b 6b e2 64 ad 86 42 da d3 a5 6d 7c 10 a6
39 f0 32 14 c7 94 e9 5b 1f 11 94 e9 53 5c b6 25 6d 7c 0c 85 88 86 42
98 f8 94 e9 5b 5c a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a da 74 2d a5 29 92 b5 b5
f1 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7 bd ef 7b de
f7 c1 cf 8b e2 a6 3e 30 53 10 a6 39 f0 63 e2 d7 b5 ee 6b d2 b6 ad ad
6b 56 b5 b5 8b 6b 16 d7 bd eb 5b 5a d7 be 2b 6b d6 d5 b5 cd 7b 5f 18
2d 8f 83 1e b6 ad ac 52 d8 b6 3e 2b 6b dc d7 bd ae 53 5e f5 35 cd 7c
5a f6 b1 6d 6b e0 a6 35 6a 6b e0 a5 2d 88 52 94 84 2d 0a 52 94 a5 29
4a 52 da f8 30 c8 51 08 43 21 0b 3a 14 c6 30 44 32 54 c6 a0 02 11 4e
95 31 cb 63 92 a6 38 e8 53 04 53 21 4c 69 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 88 84
32 56 d7 08 86 42 94 a6 8c 87 4a 9a f8 b5 f0 29 d0 a6 3e 31 39 90 a6

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

34 a7 41 d2 a6 bd ae 21 90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c8 64 25 4d 08
88 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00
6. 02 27 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42 98
e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 88 63 a1 6d
79 92 b6 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f1 32 14 c7 b1 f0 32 14 c7 3e 03 29 d2 a6
be 23 29 d2 85 b5 f0 32 14 d1 10 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 73 5e e4 29 af 7b
92 b6 9c a7 42 da 53 25 6b 6b c2 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90 a6 3e
31 8c 63 18 c6 31 89 4e 95 b5 ef 83 e2 f8 be 29 53 5e e5 31 af 6b 5a
f6 be 31 63 e2 e6 bd ee 6b df 16 b9 0b 6b 5e e6 bd f1 8c 5e f8 3e 2b
53 5e f7 c1 f1 5a d6 b5 a9 af 7c 5a e5 35 eb 5b 5a d6 be 0b 6b 58 f8
a9 8f 8c 14 c7 a9 8e 7c 18 c6 be 0a 52 94 d5 a9 af 8b 5e b6 bd 6d 7b
e0 84 29 48 42 94 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42 ce 85 31
8c 11 0c 95 31 a8 00 88 22 9d 2a 63 96 c7 25 4c 71 d0 a6 14 c8 53 1a
53 a1 4a 63 e2 b6 be 22 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29 a3 21 d2 a6 be 2d
7c 0a 74 29 8f 8c 4e 64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a 64
29 af 8b 5a f2 19 09 53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39
46 00
7. 02 49 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63 e3
05 04 65 3a 14 d7 c4 65 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d 2b
6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98 e7
c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 69 53 5f 03 21 4d 11 0c 85 31 f0 3a
54 53 94 e9 5b 5c a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a da 74 2d a5 29 92 b5 b5
f1 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7 bd ef 7b de
f7 c1 cf 8b e2 f8 a9 af 7b 94 85 b5 ae 6b df 18 c6 2d 62 da d7 bd f0
63 e0 c7 c6 2f 6b 5e e6 b9 af 7c 62 d7 b9 af 7b dc b6 be 2f 6b e3 07
b1 f1 7c 18 f6 3d 6c 7c 14 c7 2d ad 6b 5a d6 b1 cf 83 1f 18 bd ee 53
54 d7 c5 8e 7c 14 c6 31 4a 63 5c a5 b5 f1 7c 5a f8 ad af 8b e0 84 29
48 42 94 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42 ce 85 31 8c 11 0c
95 31 a8 00 84 53 a5 4c 72 d8 e4 a9 8e 3a 14 c1 14 c8 53 1a 53 a1 4a
63 e2 b6 be 22 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29 a3 21 d2 a6 be 2d 7c 0a 74
29 8f 8c 4e 64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af 8b
5a f0 8c 87 11 0c 84 a9 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
8. 02 31 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3 21
4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42 98
e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 da f8 29 aa
63 88 63 a5 6c 7c 10 a6 39 f1 39 cc 32 9d 2a 6b e2 32 9d 28 5b 5f 03
21 4c 63 c4 43 21 4c 7c 4e 95 b5 ea 6b dc a6 bd ef 82 56 d3 94 e8 5b
4a 64 ad 6d 7c 42 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7 bd
ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 be 2a 6b de e5 21 6d 6b 9a f7 c6 30 7c 62
f7 be 0b 63 e0 d7 c6 0f 83 9f 17 b9 4d 7c 58 f8 3e 2a 63 e0 a6 be 31
8c 62 b6 bd 6d 7a da d7 b9 af 6b 5a d6 b5 ee 6b 9a f7 29 af 7b e3 16
3e 0d 53 5f 05 b5 ea 63 5f 16 3d 6b 6b 1c c6 31 cc 7c 1a f8 2d af 8a
da f8 be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21 0c 84 2c
e8 53 18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 45 3a 54 c7 2d 8e 4a 98 e3 a1 4c 11 4c
85 31 a5 3a 14 a6 3e 04 32 14 c7 3e 29 5b 5f 01 10 44 3a 56 d7 29 a3
19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0 53 a1 4c 7c 4c 85 31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2
19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b
5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

9. 02 1f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8 8c
a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63 e2
32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5 6d
7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 cf 80 ca 74 a9 af 88 ca 74 2d 89 5b 5f 12
19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 6b de 22 19 08 53 5e f7 c1 2b 61 4e 53 a1 6d 29
92 b5 b5 f1 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7 bd
ef 7b de f7 c1 cf 8b e2 f8 a9 af 7b 94 85 b5 ae 6b df 18 c5 ad 7c 56
b6 b5 ef 7c 1f 18 be 0b 6b 96 d6 bd ef 8c 56 d7 bd ea 6b df 16 bd ef
8c 63 05 b5 8f 8a 9a f7 29 af 53 5f 18 29 8e 63 e3 18 31 f1 63 9c e7
3e 0a 6b 98 c5 35 ee 53 54 d7 c1 6d 7c 56 d7 bd 6d 7b e0 84 29 48 42
94 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42 ce 85 31 8c 11 0c 95 31
a8 00 88 22 9d 2a 63 90 b6 38 c8 21 92 a6 a1 4d 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2
43 88 84 32 56 d7 08 86 42 94 a6 8c 87 4a 9a f8 b5 f0 29 d0 a6 3e 31
39 90 a6 34 a7 41 d2 a6 bd ae 21 90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c2 32
1c 44 32 12 a6 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00

10. 02 25 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 c3 29 d2 b6 3e 23 29 d2 a6 b9 6c 4a da
f8 90 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 73 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a d8 53 94 e8
5b 4a 64 ad 6d 7c 42 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7
bd ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 a9 8f 8c 60 a6 21 4d 7b e0 f8 a5 6d 7b
de f7 b5 eb 6a d8 b6 b5 ad 5b 5e a6 b9 4d 73 5e f8 b5 ad 6b 5e f5 b5
af 7b de f5 ad 6d 6b 5c d7 c1 f1 8b 16 d7 be 2b 63 e0 f8 c5 6a 63 d8
f8 35 f1 8b 1c e7 3e 0a 63 9e c7 3d 4c 63 9f 06 be 2d 7b d6 d7 be 08
42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21 0c 84 2c e8 53 18 c1
10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 0b 63 8c 95 30 e8 51 4c 85 31 a5 3a
14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0
a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a
f8 b5 af 08 c8 71 10 c8 4a 98 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5
18 00

11. 02 49 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 04 65 3a 14 d7 c4 65 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 19 0a 32 14 43 1d 0b 6b e2 64 ad 86 42 da d3 a5 6d 7c 10
a6 39 f0 32 14 c7 94 e9 5b 1f 11 94 e9 5a 54 d7 c0 c8 53 44 43 21 4c
7c 0e 95 14 e5 3a 56 d7 29 af 71 90 a6 bd ee 32 56 c2 9c a7 42 da 53
25 6b 6b c2 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90 a6 3e 31 8c 63 18 c6 31 89
4e 95 b5 ef 83 e2 f8 a5 4c 7c 60 a6 39 f1 7b df 18 ad 8f 83 5f 18 c1
0a 6b df 18 c6 0e 73 1f 15 b5 ed 7a da f5 ad ac 52 da b5 ad ad 7a 9a
e5 b5 ee 63 5c d7 29 af 7a da b6 b5 af 8a d8 f8 c6 2f 5b 5a d7 35 ca
6b de f7 c1 cf 63 d4 c6 31 8e 7c 1a f8 c1 6d 5b 5e f5 b5 ef 82 10 a5
21 0a 52 94 a5 29 4a 52 96 d7 c0 c8 51 08 43 21 0b 3a 14 c6 30 44 32
54 c6 a0 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 5b 1c 95 31 c6 21 d0 a6 99 0a 69 4e 85 29
8f 81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 d7 c0 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0
53 a1 4c 7c 4c 85 31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a
6b e2 d6 bc 86 42 54 d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51
80

12. 02 55 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

46 42 88 63 1d 0b 6b 90 a6 bd e9 5b 5f 14 29 8f 3a 56 c7 94 e9 5b 1f
11 94 e9 53 5c b6 ad af 80 88 64 29 8e 73 1f 05 21 4d 7b 5e b6 be 06
42 c4 43 21 4c 79 4e 95 b1 f0 63 e3 03 21 4c 7c 63 03 21 6d 71 0e 82
9d 2a 6b ce 85 b5 af 89 4e 95 b5 e1 19 0e 94 9d 2b 6b e0 01 10 c8 53
1f 18 c6 31 8c 63 18 c4 a7 4a da f7 c1 f1 7c 52 a6 3e 31 42 98 e7 c5
ef 53 5e f7 c1 0a 63 e3 16 3e 31 8c 56 d7 c5 af 8c 14 c7 3e 2a 63 e0
f8 29 8f 5b 1f 18 c6 30 53 1e b5 ad 6b 5a d6 b5 ad 6d 6b 5a d6 3e 2b
5a d4 d7 c5 ef 7c 60 f8 c5 8f 8a 9a f7 bd ca 6b 94 a5 35 4d 7c 16 d7
c5 6d 7b d6 d7 be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21
0c 84 2c e8 53 18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 6c 72 54 c7 1d
0a 61 4c 85 31 a5 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a
32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86
42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 08 c8 71 10 c8 4a 98 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85
b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00

13. 02 19 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42
98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 da f8 29
aa 63 88 63 a5 6c 7c 10 a6 39 f1 39 cc 32 9d 2a 6b e2 32 9d 28 5b 5f
03 21 4c 63 c4 43 21 4c 7c 4e 95 b5 ea 6b dc a6 bd ee 4a da 72 9d 0b
69 4c 95 ad af 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 98 f8 c6 31 8c 63 18
c6 25 3a 56 d7 be 0f 8b e2 95 31 f1 82 98 e7 3e 31 8a 9a f8 be 31 83
9f 16 bd cd 7b de f7 be 2d 72 14 d5 35 ef 82 9a f5 a9 ae 53 5e f5 b5
6d 6b 5f 05 b1 f1 7a da d6 b5 ae 63 5e f8 b5 ca 6b de f7 c6 31 83 e2
d6 bd f1 53 1a a6 29 4c 6b e2 d7 ad 6d 7a da f8 21 0a 52 10 a5 29 4a
52 94 a5 29 6d 7c 0c 85 10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63 04 43 25 4c 6a 00 22
08 a7 4a 98 e5 b1 c9 53 1c 74 29 85 32 14 c6 94 e8 52 98 f8 ad af 88
88 43 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 68 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f 02 9d 0a 63 e3 13 99
0a 63 4a 74 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a 6b e2 d6 bc 86 42 54
d0 88 87 4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80

14. 02 3b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 c3 29 d2 b6 3e 23 29 d2 a6 b9 6c 4a da
f8 90 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 73 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a d8 53 94 e8
5b 4a 64 ad 6d 7c 52 b6 be 21 19 4e 73 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7
bd ef 7b de f7 c1 cf 8b e2 a6 3e 31 82 98 85 35 ef 83 d2 b6 3e 31 82
98 e7 c1 4c 7c 56 d7 ad ab 6a d6 d6 b9 4d 7b de d7 bd af 5a 9a f8 b5
cb 6b d4 d7 35 ef 7b dc a6 bd 6d 7c 56 b6 3e 2b 63 e3 18 be 0a 63 d8
f8 ad af 8b 5e d7 c1 6d 63 9f 17 bd cd 7c 18 a6 3e 31 63 e0 e5 29 4a
5b 1f 15 31 8c 63 1e d6 3d 6c 7c 5e b6 be 2e 42 94 a4 21 68 52 94 a5
29 4a 52 96 d7 c0 c8 51 08 43 21 0b 3a 14 c6 30 44 32 54 c6 a0 02 20
8a 74 a9 8e 42 d8 e3 20 86 4a 9a 85 34 e8 52 98 f8 ad af 89 0e 22 10
c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2 d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98
d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22
21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93 94 60

15. 02 2f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42
98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 88 74 2c
c8 5b 5e b6 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f1 32 14 c7 b1 f0 32 14 c7 3e 03 29 d2
a6 be 23 29 d2 85 b5 f0 32 14 d1 10 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 73 5e e4 29 af
7b 92 b6 9c a7 42 da 53 25 6b 6b c2 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

08 86 42 9a f7 bd ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 be 29 53 5e e5 35 ed 6b
de f8 c6 2f 7c 5a f7 bd ef 8b 5e f7 be 09 5b 58 f8 c6 0a 6b df 07 c5
6b 6b de f7 be 2b 5a da d7 2d ad 6b 5a d6 b5 f1 5a 98 f8 29 8e 63 94
c7 c1 4c 73 e0 e5 31 f0 6b 98 c6 bd f1 6b 5f 06 3d 8f 5b 1f 17 c5 6d
7c 10 a5 29 08 5a 14 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42 ce 85
31 8c 11 0c 95 31 a8 00 84 53 a5 4c 72 d8 e4 a9 8e 3a 14 c2 99 03 21
90 a6 34 65 3a 14 a6 3e 02 21 90 a6 39 f1 4a da f8 08 87 4a da e5 34
64 3a 54 d7 c5 af 81 4e 85 31 f1 32 14 c6 94 e8 3a 54 c7 c5 f1 6b 88
64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af 8b 5a f2 19 09 53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d
73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00

16. 02 59 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21
46 42 88 63 a1 6d 79 92 b6 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f1 32 14 c7 b1 f0 32 14
c7 94 e9 5b 1f 06 bc 65 3a 16 d7 25 6d 7c 0c 85 88 86 42 98 f8 94 e9
5b 5c a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a d8 53 94 e8 5b 4a 64 ad 6d 7c 42 32
1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7 bd ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73
e2 f8 be 2a 6b de e5 21 6d 6b 9a f7 c6 30 7c 62 f7 be 30 5b 5f 16 be
31 63 e0 c7 c1 8f 8b de f8 c5 ef 7c 62 b6 3e 0a 53 5f 18 2d af 83 1e
c7 c5 6c 7c 1a f8 3e 0f 82 98 f6 3e 2f 8b 9a f8 3e 2a 63 e0 a6 ad 4d
7c 1f 18 c1 6d 6b 1e b6 3e 0d 7c 5c a6 a9 8c 6b e2 c7 3d 4c 63 9f 06
be 2d 7b d6 d7 be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21
0c 84 2c e8 53 18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 6c 72 54 c7 18
87 42 9a 64 29 a5 3a 14 a6 3e 04 32 14 c7 3e 29 5b 5f 01 08 87 4a da
e5 34 64 3a 54 d7 c5 af 81 4e 85 31 f1 32 14 c6 94 e8 3a 54 c7 c5 f1
6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af 8b 5a f0 8c 87 11 0c 84 a9 87 4a 9a e4
2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80

17. 02 4b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 35 f0 42 98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21
46 42 88 63 1d 0b 6b 90 a6 bd e9 5b 5f 14 29 8f 3a 56 c7 94 e9 5b 1f
11 94 e9 53 5c b6 ad af 80 88 64 29 8e 73 1f 05 21 4d 7b 5e b6 be 06
42 c4 43 21 4c 79 4e 95 b1 f0 63 e3 03 21 4c 7c 63 03 21 6d 71 0e 82
9d 2a 6b ce 85 b5 af 89 4e 95 b5 e1 19 0e 94 9d 2b 6b e2 74 ad af 80
04 43 21 4d 7b de f7 bd ef 7b de f8 39 f1 7c 52 a6 3e 31 42 98 f8 bd
f1 82 14 c7 c5 2b 6b 5a d6 b5 ad 6b dc a6 bd 6b 5a d6 b5 35 f1 83 e2
d5 ad 6d 7a 9a f8 b5 ad 62 d8 f5 a9 8c 7c 14 c7 c5 cb 6b 5a e6 bd f1
8a da f7 b9 8d 72 da f7 bd ea 63 5f 16 39 eb 53 18 f6 3e 2b 6b d6 d7
c1 0a 52 90 85 a1 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21 0c 84 2c e8 53
18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 6c 72 54 c7 1d 0a 61 4c 85 31
a5 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2
d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6
42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93
94 60

18. 02 37 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42
98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 88 63 a1
6d 79 92 b6 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f1 32 14 c7 b1 f0 32 14 c7 3e 03 29 d2
a6 be 23 29 d2 85 b5 f0 32 14 d1 10 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 73 5e e4 29 af
7b e0 95 b4 e5 3a 16 d2 99 2b 5b 5f 14 ad af 88 46 53 9c e9 5b 5f 00
08 86 42 9a f7 bd ef 7b de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 a9 8f 8c 14 c4 29 8e 7c

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

52 b6 bd ad 6b 5e f7 bd ef 53 5c b6 b1 6d 73 1a a6 be 2f 82 98 d7 2d
af 8b da f7 b5 af 82 da f8 be 30 7c 58 f8 35 ef 8a da f5 b5 ef 53 5c
a6 a9 ae 5b 5e f5 b5 af 8c 58 e7 c5 4c 7b 1c e7 c1 4c 7b 1c f5 31 8f
63 d6 c7 c5 f1 5b 5f 04 29 4a 42 16 85 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 6d 7c 0c 85
10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63 04 43 25 4c 6a 00 21 14 e9 53 1c b6 39 2a 63
8e 85 30 45 32 14 c6 94 e8 52 98 f8 10 c8 53 1c f8 a5 6d 7c 04 22 1d
2b 6b 94 d1 90 e9 53 5f 16 be 05 3a 14 c7 c4 c8 53 1a 53 a0 e9 53 1f
17 c5 ae 21 90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 35 ed 7c 5a f2 19 09 53 42 22 1d 2a
6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00

19. 02 4f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 a5 6d 7c 46 53
a1 6d 7c 08 64 28 87 42 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 11 0c 85 19 0a 21 d0 b6 bc c9 5b 0c 85 b5
ef 3a 56 d7 c4 c8 53 1e c7 a9 a8 53 1f 03 21 4c 73 e0 d7 c0 65 3a 16
d7 c4 65 29 92 b6 be 02 21 90 a6 29 8e 41 4c 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c5 4c
7c 60 a6 3e 31 82 16 d7 1d 22 29 d2 a6 bc e8 5b 5a f8 94 e9 5b 5e 11
90 e9 49 d2 b6 be 27 4a da f8 00 44 32 14 d7 bd ef 7b de f7 bd ef 83
9f 17 c5 f1 4a 9a f7 a1 4d 7b 5a f7 be 31 8b df 18 21 4c 7c 1a f7 bd
cb 6b df 16 be 31 5b 5e d7 a9 ae 53 5e d7 c6 0f 5a d6 c7 c1 8d 7c 63
05 31 f0 7c 56 c7 c5 4d 7b e0 b6 3e 30 63 e3 15 b5 ef 7b d4 d7 2d af
73 5f 16 b1 f0 73 e0 c7 39 6c 7a d8 f5 ad ac 73 18 c7 c1 af 6b d6 d7
be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21 0c 84 2c e8 53
18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 6c 72 54 c7 1d 0a 61 4c 85 31
a5 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 18 86 4a da e1 10 c8 52 94 d1 8c 87 4a 9a
f8 b5 f0 29 d0 a6 3e 31 39 90 a6 34 a7 41 d2 a6 bd ae 21 90 a5 29 82
29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c2 32 1c 44 32 12 a6 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1
10 c9 39 46 00

20. 02 55 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 90 23 29 d0 a6 be 25 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 19 0a 32 14 43 1d 0b 6b e2 64 ad 86 42 da d3 a5 6d 7c 10
a6 39 f0 32 14 c7 94 e9 5b 1f 11 94 e9 53 5c b6 25 6d 7c 0c 85 88 86
42 98 f8 94 e9 5b 5c a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a d8 53 94 e8 5b 4a 64
ad 6d 7c 42 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7 bd ef 7b
de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 be 2a 6b de e5 21 6d 6b 9a f7 c6 30 7c 63 05 b1
6d 6b 1f 15 b5 8f 82 98 f8 b5 eb 6b 5e e5 35 ca 62 9a f8 b5 f0 63 d8
f8 c5 6a 63 96 c7 c5 ad 73 5e f8 c1 f1 83 5e e5 35 ef 8c 62 b6 3e 2a
6b e3 05 b1 f1 83 1f 16 b5 ae 6a 98 c6 be 2c 73 d4 c6 39 f0 6b e2 d7
bd 6d 7b e0 84 29 48 42 94 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42
ce 85 31 8c 11 0c 95 31 a8 00 88 22 9d 2a 63 96 c7 25 4c 71 88 74 29
a6 42 9a 53 a1 4a 63 e0 43 21 4c 73 e2 95 b5 f0 10 88 74 ad ae 53 46
43 a5 4d 7c 5a f8 14 e8 53 1f 13 21 4c 69 4e 83 a5 4c 7c 5f 16 b8 86
42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 08 c8 71 10 c8 4a 98 74 a9 ae 42 ce 85
b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00

21. 02 3f b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42
98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 88 63 a1
6d 79 92 b6 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f1 32 14 c7 b1 f0 32 14 c7 94 e9 5b 1f
06 b9 6d 78 ca 64 ad af 7c 0c 85 88 86 42 98 f8 94 e9 5b 5c a6 bd c6
42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 b6 bc 23 21 d2 93 a5 6d 7c 00 22
19 0a 63 e3 18 c6 31 8c 63 18 94 e9 5b 5e f8 3e 2f 8b e2 95 35 ee 53
1a f6 b5 af 6b e3 18 b1 f0 63 98 f8 31 0a 63 d8 f8 c1 8f 8b 5e d5 ad

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
ae 6b df 16 ad 8b 6b e2 f7 c6 2a 63 e3 18 3e 31 7a da f7 bd ee 53 5c
d7 be 31 6a d6 b5 b5 ad 73 5f 05 29 4b 6b e2 a6 a9 8a 53 18 d7 c1 6d
7c 5a f8 21 4a 63 14 a6 31 8c 63 18 c6 31 8c 63 e2 95 b5 f1 6b e0 64
28 84 21 90 85 30 44 32 54 d7 b0 02 21 0e 95 b5 e3 29 d2 b6 be 06 31
90 a5 29 8c 72 16 c7 19 2a 61 d0 a1 14 c8 53 1a 53 a1 4a 63 e2 b6 be
22 21 0c 95 b5 c2 21 90 a5 29 a3 21 d2 a6 be 2d 7c 0a 74 29 8f 8c 4e
64 29 8d 29 d0 74 a9 af 6b 88 64 29 4a 60 8a 64 29 af 8b 5a f2 19 09
53 42 22 1d 2a 6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
22. 02 39 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 04 65 3a 14 d7 c4 65 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98
e7 c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 69 53 5f 03 21 4d 11 0c 85 31 f0
21 d2 74 ad af 29 d0 a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a d8 53 94 e8 5b 4a 64
ad 6d 7c 42 32 1d 29 3a 56 d7 c4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 9a f7 bd ef 7b
de f7 bd f0 73 e2 f8 a9 8f 8c 60 a6 21 4d 7b e0 f8 a5 6d 7b de f7 b9
4d 7b e3 18 b5 8b 6b 5f 15 ad 4c 73 e0 d7 c1 ce 7c 62 d7 b5 ed 73 5c
d7 be 2d 6b e2 f8 bd ef 7c 63 18 29 8f 6b 1c c6 39 4c 73 e0 d7 be 2c
7c 1f 15 ad 4d 7c 58 e7 3e 0f 5a da c7 31 8c 7c 1a f6 bd 6d 7b e0 84
29 48 42 94 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 b5 f0 32 14 42 10 c8 42 ce 85 31 8c 11
0c 95 31 a8 00 88 22 9d 2a 63 90 b6 38 c8 21 92 a6 a1 4d 3a 14 a6 3e
06 42 98 e7 c5 2b 6b e0 41 08 87 4a da e5 35 f0 3a 54 c7 c6 28 53 44
53 a5 4d 71 90 a6 31 86 11 0e 85 35 f1 6b 5e 32 99 25 32 54 d0 88 87
4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
23. 02 4b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 90 23 29 d0 a6 be 25 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98
e7 c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 4d 7a 16 d7 c0 c8 58 88 64 29 8f
81 4e 53 a5 6d 72 9a f7 19 0a 6b de e3 25 6c 29 ca 74 2d a5 32 56 b6
bc 23 21 d2 93 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 63 e3 18 c6 31 8c 63 18 94 e9 5b
5e f8 3e 2f 8a 54 c7 c6 0a 63 9c f8 c5 f1 7c 56 d6 b5 c8 53 54 d7 bd
ef 7b de f7 29 af 8b 1f 15 b1 f1 82 98 f8 c6 2c 7c 1a e5 b5 ad 7b 9a
a6 be 0b 63 e2 b6 b9 ae 6b 94 d7 bd ef 53 5c a6 be 2b 6b de f8 ad 6d
6b 5a e6 bd f1 5a d8 e7 3e 0c 72 d8 f5 31 8c 7b 58 f8 bd 6d 7a da f8
21 0a 52 10 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 6d 7c 0c 85 10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63
04 43 25 4c 6a 00 22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 54 c3 a1 45 32 14 c6 94
e8 52 98 f8 ad af 88 88 43 25 6d 70 88 64 29 4a 68 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f
02 9d 0a 63 e3 13 99 0a 63 4a 74 1d 2a 6b da e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a
6b e2 d6 bc 23 21 c4 43 21 2a 61 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93
94 60
24. 02 37 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 a5 6d 7c 46 53
a1 6d 7c 08 64 28 87 42 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 11 0c 85 19 0a 21 d0 b3 21 6d 7a d8 64 2d
ad 3a 56 d7 c4 c8 53 1e c7 c0 c8 53 1c f8 0c a7 4a 9a f8 8c a7 42 da
e4 ad af 81 90 a6 88 86 42 98 f8 94 e9 5b 5c d7 b8 c8 53 5e f7 c1 2b
61 4e 53 a1 6d 29 92 b5 b5 f1 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 7c 00 22
19 0a 6b de f7 bd ef 7b de f7 c1 cf 8b e2 f8 a9 af 7b 96 d7 c1 2b 5b
16 d6 bd ef 6b 5c d7 b5 ad 73 5e f7 b5 eb 6a da f8 ad 8f 8b de f7 c5
f1 53 1e c7 c1 8f 82 98 f8 3e 30 63 9f 18 c5 ef 7b df 05 31 cb 6b 58
f8 bd ef 83 5e f8 31 f1 6b 9a f7 c1 ec 73 9f 05 29 8c 62 9a e5 35 4d
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
72 da f8 ad af 6b d6 d7 be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03
21 44 21 0c 84 2c e8 53 18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 0b 63
8c 82 19 2a 6a 14 d3 a1 4a 63 e0 64 29 8e 7c 52 b6 be 02 20 84 43 a5
6d 72 9a 31 90 e9 53 5f 16 be 05 3a 14 c7 c4 c8 53 1a 53 a0 e9 53 1f
17 c5 ae 21 90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c2 32 1c 44 32 12 a6 1d 2a
6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
25.      02 4b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b ce 95 b5 f0 5b 5f 02 19 0a 21 d0 b6 3e 30 11 4e 85 35 f0 42
98 e0 8c a6 4a d8 f8 8c 87 4a 9a f3 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 46 42 88 63 1d
0b 6b 90 a6 bd e9 5b 5f 14 29 8f 3a 56 c7 c0 c8 53 1c f8 0c a7 4a 9a
f8 8c a7 4a 16 d7 c0 c8 53 44 43 21 4c 79 d2 b6 3e 0c 7c 60 85 31 f1
8c 10 b6 b8 e8 29 d2 a6 bc e8 5b 5a f8 94 e9 5b 5e 11 90 e9 49 d2 b6
be 00 11 0c 85 31 f1 8c 63 18 c6 31 8c 4a 74 ad af 7c 1f 17 c5 f1 4a
9a f7 a1 4d 7b 5a f7 be 31 83 90 a6 3e 2e 6b df 16 bd ed 6b e0 b6 bd
cd 7c 1c f8 3e 0c 7c 1c a6 3e 0f 83 e2 a6 3e 0a 6a 9a f8 be 0f 8b 5e
b6 ad ad 7b dc d7 29 af 7c 56 c7 c1 8f 8b 5e b5 ad 6b 6b 5e e5 35 ef
6b e2 b6 3e 0e 73 e0 c7 2d 8f 53 18 c7 b5 8f 8a da f5 b5 f0 42 94 a4
21 68 52 94 a5 29 4a 52 96 d7 c0 c8 51 08 43 21 0b 3a 14 c6 30 44 32
54 c6 a0 02 20 8a 74 a9 8e 5b 1c 95 31 c7 42 98 53 21 4c 69 4e 85 29
8f 81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 d7 c0 42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0
53 a1 4c 7c 4c 85 31 a5 3a 0e 95 31 f1 7c 5a e2 19 0a 52 98 22 99 0a
6b e2 d6 bc 23 21 c4 43 21 2a 61 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93
94 60
26.      02 37 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 62
c8 11 94 e8 5b 1f 12 99 2a 6b 96 d6 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98
e7 c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 4d 7a 16 d7 c0 c8 58 88 64 29 8f
81 4e 53 a5 6d 72 9a f7 19 0a 6b de f8 19 2b 61 4e 53 a1 6d 29 92 b5
b5 f1 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7 bd ef 7b
de f7 c1 cf 8b e2 f8 a9 af 7b 96 d7 c1 2b 5b 16 d6 bd ee 6b 9a f7 b5
8b 6b de b5 ad ad 6b 56 b6 be 0f 83 1f 17 c1 6d 6b da f8 c1 6d 7b 9a
f7 c6 2d 7b e0 a6 39 4b 6b 58 f5 31 f0 7c 14 d7 be 0d 7b de e6 be 0e
5b 1e b6 3d 8e 63 1c f8 bd 6d 7a da f8 21 0a 52 10 a5 29 4a 52 94 a5
29 6d 7c 0c 85 10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63 04 43 25 4c 6a 00 22 08 a7 4a
98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 0c 87 11 08 64 ad
ae 11 0c 85 29 4d 18 c8 74 a9 af 8b 5f 02 9d 0a 63 e3 05 9c c8 53 1a
e3 21 4c 63 04 43 a1 4d 7c 5a d7 8c a0 19 4c 92 19 23 29 92 a6 1d 2a
6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
27.      02 37 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 bc e9 5b 5f 04 ad af 81 0c 85 2d 8f 8c 04 53 a1 4d 7c
10 a6 38 23 29 92 b6 3e 23 21 d2 a6 bc e9 5b 5f 01 10 c6 42 da f8 19
0a 6a 98 e2 18 e9 5b 1f 04 29 8e 7c 4e 73 0c a7 4a 9a f8 8c a7 4a 16
d7 c0 c8 53 18 f1 10 c8 53 1f 13 a5 6d 7a 9a f7 29 af 7b e0 95 b4 e5
3a 16 d2 99 2b 5b 5f 10 8c 87 4a 4e 95 b5 f1 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90 a6
bd ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7c 1c f8 be 2a 63 e3 18 29 88 53 5e f8 3e 0f 8c
52 b6 bd af 7b de f7 35 ee 53 5e b6 2d 8b 6b 56 d7 c5 6c 7c 5f 17 c1
af 7c 5f 15 35 ea 6b e0 e7 c1 4d 73 5f 07 c6 30 53 1f 15 b1 f0 7c 63
18 c6 31 8c 56 b5 a9 ae 6b e0 a6 bd f1 5b 1c f8 3d 6b 6b 1c c6 31 cc
7c 1a f8 2d af 8a da f8 be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03
21 44 21 0c 84 2c e8 53 18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 45 3a 54 c7 2d 8e 4a
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
98 e3 a1 4c 11 4c 85 31 a5 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 18 86 4a da e1 10
c8 52 94 d1 8c 87 4a 9a f8 b5 f0 29 d0 a6 3e 31 39 90 a6 34 a7 41 d2
a6 bd ae 21 90 a5 29 82 29 90 a6 be 2d 6b c2 32 1c 44 32 12 a6 1d 2a
6b 90 b3 a1 6d 73 18 c1 10 c9 39 46 00
28. 02 35 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 c3 29 d2 b6 3e 0d 78 ca 74 2d ae 4a da
f8 90 c8 53 1f 14 2d af 3a 56 d7 29 af 78 88 43 21 4d 7b dc 43 25 6d
29 d0 b6 94 c9 5a da f0 8c 87 4a 4e 95 b5 f1 3a 56 d7 c0 02 21 90 a6
bd ef 7b de f7 bd ef 7c 1c f8 be 29 53 1f 18 29 8e 7c 5e f7 ad ad 6b
5a d6 b5 ad 6b 5a f8 b5 f0 42 da d7 b9 af 83 1f 06 3e 31 53 5c b6 bd
ef 7b 9a f8 39 f1 8c 60 c7 b1 f0 6b df 05 35 f1 7c 60 e7 3e 0d 7c 60
f5 b1 f1 53 5f 17 bd f1 82 d8 f8 ad 8e 7c 1a e6 31 4a 63 5f 05 b5 f1
5b 5e f5 b5 ef 82 10 a5 21 0a 52 94 a5 29 4a 52 96 d7 c0 c8 51 08 43
21 0b 3a 14 c6 30 44 32 54 c6 a0 02 29 d2 a6 38 65 3a 14 c7 b0 c8 5b
1c 43 25 4c 21 d0 b3 21 4c 69 4e 85 29 8f 81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 d7 c0
42 21 d2 b6 b9 4d 19 0e 95 35 f1 6b e0 53 a1 4c 7c 62 64 29 8d 71 90
a6 31 86 11 0e 85 35 f1 6b 5e 32 80 65 32 48 64 8c a6 4a 98 74 a9 ae
42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00
29. 02 4b b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 90 a6 b9 62 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 63
e3 05 90 23 29 d0 a6 be 25 32 16 d7 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98
e7 c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 69 53 5f 03 21 4d 11 0c 85 31 f0
3a 54 53 94 e9 5b 5c a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 0a 72 9d 0b 69 4c 95
ad af 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 98 f8 c6 31 8c 63 18 c6 25 3a
56 d7 be 0f 8b e2 95 31 f1 82 98 e7 c5 ef 53 5f 17 c6 30 42 98 f6 39
f1 8b d6 d6 b5 af 73 5e f7 bd cd 72 9a f8 c6 31 8a d8 b6 b5 eb 6b 16
c5 b5 ab 5b 5e a6 be 0a 63 e2 b6 3e 0d 7c 60 d7 c5 f0 7b 1f 06 b9 4d
53 5f 05 35 4d 7c 16 d7 c5 6c 73 e0 c6 a9 8a 53 1a f8 b5 eb 6b d6 d7
be 08 42 94 84 29 4a 52 94 a5 29 4a 5b 5f 03 21 44 21 0c 84 2c e8 53
18 c1 10 c9 53 1a 80 08 82 29 d2 a6 39 6c 72 54 c7 1d 0a 61 4c 85 31
a5 3a 14 a6 3e 2b 6b e2 22 10 c9 5b 5c 22 19 0a 52 9a 32 1d 2a 6b e2
d7 c0 a7 42 98 f8 c4 e6 42 98 d2 9d 07 4a 9a f6 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6
42 9a f8 b5 af 21 90 95 34 22 21 d2 a6 b9 0b 3a 16 d7 31 8c 11 0c 93
94 60
30. 02 35 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad af 3a 54 d7 29 a5 32 54 d7 29 af 4a da f8
8c a6 4a da f8 10 c8 52 d8 f8 c0 45 3a 14 d7 c1 0a 63 82 32 99 2b 63
e2 32 1d 2a 6b 84 43 21 26 42 98 85 29 8d 7c 0c 85 31 f1 89 4e 93 a5
6d 7c 54 c7 9d 2b 63 e0 85 31 e5 3a 56 c7 c4 65 3a 54 d7 2d 89 5b 5f
12 19 0a 63 e2 74 ad ae 53 5e f1 10 c6 42 9a f7 be 06 4a da 74 2d a5
29 92 b5 b5 f1 08 c8 74 a4 e9 5b 5f 13 a5 6d 7c 00 22 19 0a 6b de f7
bd ef 7b de f7 c1 cf 8b e2 a6 3e 31 82 98 85 35 ef 83 e0 c7 c1 8f 8a
56 b5 ad 4c 7c 1f 18 29 8f 5b 1f 15 35 cb 6b de f7 c5 8f 8c 18 e7 c1
f1 5b 5e b6 bd 6d 5b 56 d6 b5 ae 6b de f7 bd ca 6a 9a f8 2d ad 6b 5a
f7 be 31 8c 56 b6 bd ef 7b e0 a6 a9 8e 73 e0 c7 b1 eb 63 98 c7 3d 6c
7c 5f 15 b5 f0 42 94 a4 21 68 52 94 a5 29 4a 52 96 d7 c0 c8 51 08 43
21 0b 3a 14 c6 30 44 32 54 c6 a0 02 11 4e 95 31 cb 63 92 a6 38 e8 53
04 53 21 4c 69 4e 85 29 8f 81 0c 85 31 cf 8a 56 d7 c0 44 11 0e 95 b5
ca 68 c6 43 a5 4d 7c 5a f8 14 e8 53 1f 13 21 4c 69 4e 83 a5 4c 7c 5f
```

Algebraic Eraser OTA Authentication

```
16 b8 86 42 94 a6 08 a6 42 9a f8 b5 af 08 c8 71 10 c8 4a 98 74 a9 ae
42 ce 85 b5 cc 63 04 43 24 e5 18 00
31. 02 39 b5 ac 00 88 74 ad ae 29 d2 a6 b8 65 3a 16 d7 8c a6 4a da e3
21 4a 6b 98 85 35 e2 21 90 b6 bc a7 4a da f8 a5 6d 7c 04 43 21 0b 62
c8 11 94 e8 5b 1f 12 99 2a 6b 96 d6 25 6d 7c 08 64 29 8e 7c 1a f8 9d
2b 6b e0 22 18 c8 59 0c 84 2d af 82 56 c2 19 0b 6b 4e 95 b5 f0 42 98
e7 c0 c8 53 1e 53 a5 6c 7c 46 53 a5 69 53 5f 03 21 4d 11 0c 85 31 f0
21 d2 74 ad af 29 d0 a6 bd c6 42 9a f7 b8 c9 5b 4e 85 b4 a5 32 56 11
90 c9 5a d2 b6 bc e9 5b 5f 00 08 86 42 98 f8 c6 31 8c 63 18 c6 25 3a
56 d7 be 0f 8b e2 95 31 f1 82 98 e7 3e 31 53 1f 18 c6 08 53 1f 18 b1
f0 63 e0 f8 c5 ad 5a d8 f8 ad 4c 7c 60 a6 3e 2b 6b d6 d7 b9 ae 5b 5a
d7 bd ef 62 da f5 35 cb 6b da f7 b5 f1 6b e3 07 ad 8f 83 5f 16 b9 6d
7c 58 a5 2d ae 53 18 d5 ad 4d 7c 5e d7 ad 6d 7a da f8 21 0a 52 10 a5
29 4a 52 94 a5 29 6d 7c 0c 85 10 84 32 10 b3 a1 4c 63 04 43 25 4c 6a
00 22 08 a7 4a 98 e4 2d 8e 32 08 64 a9 a8 53 4e 85 29 8f 8a da f8 0c
87 11 08 64 ad ae 11 0c 85 29 4d 7c 1e 31 90 c4 3a 54 c7 c6 29 42 9a
74 a9 ae 32 14 c6 30 44 3a 14 d7 c5 af 6b 9a 32 99 25 32 54 d0 88 87
4a 9a e4 2c e8 5b 5c c6 30 44 32 4e 51 80
```

Bibliography

- [1] A. G. Myasnikov, V. Shpilrain, and A. Ushakov, Group-based Cryptography. Advanced Courses in Mathematics – CRM Barcelona, Birkhauser Basel, 2008.
- [2] I. Anshel, M. Anshel, D. Goldfeld, S. Lemieux, “Key Agreement, The Algebraic Eraser™, and Lightweight Cryptography,” Contemporary Math. 418 (2006), 1–17.
- [3] M. R. Magyarik and N. R. Wagner, A Public Key Cryptosystem Based on the Word Problem. Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 1984, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 196, pp. 19–36. Springer, Berlin, 1985.
- [4] K. H. Ko, S. J. Lee, J. H. Cheon, J. W. Han, J. Kang, and C. Park, New public-key cryptosystem using braid groups. Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2000, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1880, pp. 166–183. Springer, Berlin, 2000.
- [5] Patrick Dehornoy, "A fast method for comparing braids," Advances in Math., 125 (1997) 200-235.
- [6] Joan Birman, J.S. Lee, K.H. Ko, “A new approach to the word and conjugacy problems in the braid groups,” Advances in Mathematics, 139, No. 2 (1998), 322- 353.
- [7] D. Goldfeld, P.E. Gunnells, “Defeating the Kalka-Teicher-Tsaban Linear Algebra Attack on the Algebraic Eraser”, 2012, <http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.0598>